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This thesis explores the degree to which U.S. policy toward Venezuela helps to explain 
the decrease of U.S. influence in Latin America, focusing on the period since 1998, when 
left-leaning Hugo Chávez took office as President of Venezuela. The thesis argues that 
U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela has negatively affected its regional influence in 
Latin America, in two ways. First, by adopting policy stances toward Venezuela that have 
been both swift and hardline relative to the dominant Organization of American States 
(OAS) stances, the U.S. has to a certain degree isolated itself from the OAS, an 
organization that operates on consensus. Second, it seems that U.S. antagonism toward 
Venezuela has helped encourage the rise of regional organizations that compete with the 
OAS and in which the U.S. is not a part. Therefore, to the extent to which the U.S. has 
retained influence in the OAS, that influence matters less at a regional level than it 
otherwise would, due to the competing organizations. The thesis argues that, to regain 
some of its lost influence within Latin America, the United States must first pursue 
matters of mutual agreement within the OAS to regain trust from the member states. 
From there, the United States can once again engage in effective foreign policy with 
Venezuela, but through the OAS as an intermediary. 
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A. BASIS FOR THESIS 
The December 1998 election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías 
marked, for many experts on Latin America, a shift in the political landscape of Latin 
America and U.S. influence in the region. Chávez, elected on a platform centered on 
reforming the constitution and promoting social development and equality, was viewed 
by nay academics as leading the rise of a “new left” in Latin America, and, from the 
perspective of many U.S. policy makers, a dangerous one at that, given his strong anti-
American rhetoric and his enthusiasm for Latin-America-based coalitions that contrasted 
with traditional U.S. hegemony in the region.  
Chávez’s populist rule (1999–2013) did, indeed, veer far afield from the prior 
political dynamic in Venezuela, whereby two entrenched, famously corrupt political 
parties had governed comfortably through the distribution of oil wealth in the form of 
patronage.1  And in terms of relations with the United States, Chávez put forth a policy of 
weakening dependence on the U.S. hegemon throughout the region.2  Prior to the election 
of Chávez, the United States and Venezuela had long served as allies thanks to years of 
mutual trade and investment.3  Over the next 15 years however, quite the opposite 
happened as Chávez embarked on a back-and-forth campaign of anti-American rhetoric 
that lasted until his death in 2013. In his place, he left behind a politically polarized 
nation with an uncertain future.4 
There is no doubt that relations between the United States and Venezuela 
deteriorated from the early 2000s until the present, particularly following the 2002 coup 
                                                
1 Steve Ellner, “Introduction: The Search for Explanations,” in Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, 
Polarization & Conflict, eds. Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 15–17. 
2 Daniel Hellinger, “Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo,” in 
Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization & Conflict, eds. Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 46. 
3 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL32488) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2006), 12. 
4 Javier Corrales, “Chavismo After Chávez,” Foreign Affairs, January 4, 2013, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138745/javier-corrales/chavismo-after-chavez.  
2 
in Venezuela, where Chávez placed at least some of the blame on the United States. 
Whether it was then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld comparing Chávez to Adolf 
Hitler on February 2, 2006; Chávez referring to President George W. Bush as the devil in 
front of the United Nations (UN) National Assembly on September 20, 2006; or the 
administration of President Barack Obama revoking the diplomatic visa of the 
Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States in 2010; there have been countless actions 
by both sides that serve to prove the point.5   
Furthermore, as a whole, the United States has lost influence both politically and 
economically in Latin America.6  For example, a rising global power in China has 
worked its way into the markets of many Latin American states. As of 2012, countries 
such as Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile all export more goods to China than they do to the 
United States.7  In the political realm, the United States no longer holds the same power 
that it used to in one of Latin America’s most important regional organizations: the 
Organization of American States (OAS). Whereas states used to side with the United 
States, they are now more than ever presenting independent foreign policy choices.8  
Yet to what extent were Chávez and his policies, and perhaps his rhetoric alone, 
and U.S. responses to Chávez, responsible for decreased U.S. influence in Latin 
America?  If such a causal relationship does exist, what policy shifts should the U.S. 
undertake vis-à-vis Venezuela to improve its relations with the region more broadly?  
                                                
5 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL32488) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2006),19-20; Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Issues for Congress 
(CRS Report No. R40938) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2012), 18. 
6 Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Beyond Orthodoxy: Asserting Latin America's New Strategic 
Options Toward the United States," Latin American Politics & Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 137, doi: 10.1111/j.1548-
2456.2011.00136.x. 
7 “Trade Profiles,” World Trade Organization, accessed March 3, 2014, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AR,BR,CA,CL,CO,MX,PA,PE
,VE,CR. 
8 Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. 
R42639) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2013), 1-2. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
This thesis is relevant for two primary reasons: the U.S. government has (1) lost 
influence in a region of strategic importance and (2) highlighted Venezuela as a key area 
of contention in Latin America. Are the concerns that arose during the rise of Chávez 
justified and are they connected to loss of influence in the region?   
The United States has always had ties to Latin America, and not just because of 
proximity. In Modern Latin America, Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. 
Green highlight economic interests, political links, and the Latinization of the United 
States as reasons why the region matters.9  Throughout much of history, the relationship 
has been one-sided, the dominant view in the literature being that the United States was 
the benefactor, exploiting Latin America. Reasons range from dependency theory, a 
complex idea in its own right, to U.S. imperialism and a multitude of explanations in 
between.10  Nevertheless, the tables have seemed to shift recently with Latin American 
states behaving in ways that go against U.S. interests. Making matters more complicated, 
Venezuela can be found at the heart of many of these challenges to U.S. authority. For 
example, the OAS met on March 7, 2014, to discuss recent civil unrest in Venezuela. The 
United States argued that the government of Venezuela was behind human rights 
violations and was demoting democracy in the region. When it came time to vote, 
however, the United States stood alongside Panama and Canada as the only OAS 
members to disagree with the resolution that asked for solidarity and support for 
democratic institutions, dialogue, and peace in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.11  
Up to this point, the United States had identified the situation as one where the elected 
government of Venezuela was committing serious human rights violations against its 
citizens and refusing to negotiate with opposition. Expecting other members to agree that 
                                                
9 Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, Modern Latin America, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 3-4. 
10 Robert A. Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 7-32. 
11 Permanent Council of the OAS, “Solidarity and Support for Democratic Institutions, Dialogue, and Peace in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” Organization of American States, March 7, 2014, 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/dec51.asp. 
4 
the OAS must take action, the United States was instead surprised by the organization’s 
choice to honor a policy of non-intervention.12 
When looking back even further, one can see the shift away from U.S. influence 
beginning to form. As the United States was making its case for war with Iraq in 2003, it 
approached the UN Security Council seeking an approved UN resolution for military 
action. Latin America’s representatives, Chile and Mexico—non-permanent members on 
the Security Council—did not support the use of force in Iraq. What would have been 
valuable votes in favor of the United States instead ended contradictory to U.S. 
expectations.13  Meanwhile, Chávez was denouncing the U.S. actions and meeting with 
Saddam Hussein of Iraq and other important leaders of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).14  If the United States wants to understand the factors that 
are contributing to loss of influence in Latin America, it must first understand the role of 
Venezuela in the region. There has been little research into the second and third order 
effects generated by foreign policy toward Venezuela. Perhaps exploring this avenue will 
provide options for regaining support in Latin America.    
C. PROBLEMS 
The first and most important problem in answering the question posed by this 
thesis is defining what in fact U.S. foreign policy has been in relation to Venezuela. 
Foreign policy is difficult to describe in the sense that it can be split into two distinct 
categories that often present a different picture: what is said and what is done. There are 
many ways to determine foreign policy through political speech, including press releases, 
governmental reports, and speeches given by government officials to Congress and to the 
media. The problem becomes more complex because the messages presented are not 
always cohesive. For example, the President may provide broad, generalized guidance for 
                                                
12 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. R43239) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, April 11, 2014), 18. 
13 Mónica Serrano and Paul Kenny, “Iraq and World Order: A Latin American Perspective,” in The Iraq Crisis 
and World Order: Structural, Institutional, and Normative Challenges, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Waheguru Pal Singh 
Sidhu (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), 311-312. 
14 Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon (Boulder, CO: 
Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2008), 136. 
5 
how to handle relations with Venezuela. Officials in the Department of Defense and 
Department of State, making the messages even more disparate as they trickle down, may 
then interpret this broad guidance differently.   
Complicating matters even more, the United States has performed inconsistently 
with its political rhetoric. Certain basic dimensions of U.S. relations with Venezuela have 
been relatively smooth despite U.S. antagonism toward Chávez. For example, on 
September 15, 2005, President Bush denounced Venezuela for failing to uphold 
international agreements, yet he refused to implement economic sanctions.15  More 
generally, from the year 2000 until present day, the United States has consistently 
denounced both President Chávez and now President Nicolás Maduro for their policies 
across a range of topics, including violation of human rights, counternarcotics operations 
on the Venezuelan border with Colombia, and threats to freedom of expression. All the 
while, the two countries continued to maintain a strong economic relationship.16  This 
paradoxical relationship has the potential to create confusion and mistrust within the 
region as statements by the United States fail to match up with its actions. 
Crucially, the disjuncture between U.S. rhetoric and actions vis-à-vis Venezuela 
also runs in the other direction. The United States, which supposedly since the conclusion 
of the Cold War has adamantly supported democracy throughout Latin America, stood 
alone in the hemisphere in 2002 when it recognized the right-wing, short-lived 
government of Pedro Carmona who came to power via a military coup against Chávez.17 
The second problem presented by this thesis is attempting to show that the actions 
of the United States with regard to Venezuela either have or have not had an effect on 
other countries in the region. The thesis will present a hard test of the hypothesis that 
there has been such an effect, by examining whether or not the influence of the United 
                                                
15 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy  (CRS Report No. RL32488) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, September 23, 2005), 11. 
16 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. R43239) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, September 23, 2005), 16–32. 
17 Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106–107.; K. Larry Storrs et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Legislative 
Issues in 2001-2002 (CRS Report No. RL30971) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 18, 2002), 
21. 
6 
States within the OAS—traditionally influenced substantially by the U.S. government—
has changed, and whether that change was in part a result of the country’s policies toward 
Venezuela.      
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The bulk of writing on Venezuela since the start of the new millennium has 
focused on Hugo Chávez. This emphasis perhaps should not be surprising, as Chávez 
stands out for being democratically elected on a social development platform, radically 
anti-United States—at least in his rhetoric—and highly charismatic. The unfortunate 
downside of the Chávez magnet is that he has attracted nearly all literature to himself, 
both domestically and internationally. Left behind to secondhand comments in articles is 
the role of the United States. While Chávez almost inevitably attributed a problem to the 
United States each time he spoke, there is little attention paid to the policy actions taken 
by the United States toward Venezuela, and even less attention paid to how those policies 
affect other states within the region.    
For many academics, the election of President Obama and the departure of 
President Bush presented the perfect opportunity for reconciliation between the two 
states. In her chapter “Engaging Venezuela: 2009 and Beyond,” Jennifer McCoy 
proposed the United States pursue a policy of engagement instead of isolation. She 
acknowledges the difficulty in this policy due to the Bolivarian Revolution having a goal 
of lessening U.S. dominance in Latin America, so instead she recommends promoting 
democracy through the international community. Through Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) and regional organizations, such as the OAS, she thinks progress 
can be made to better U.S.-Venezuelan relations.18  Following along the same idea that 
direct U.S. action regarding Venezuela will become fuel for propaganda, Harold 
Trinkunas also calls on the international community. In his article “Venezuela Breaks 
Down in Violence,” Trinkunas states that it is nearly impossible for the United States to 
gain ground through interaction with Venezuela, and that the OAS is too bogged down 
                                                
18 Jennifer McCoy, “Engaging Venezuela: 2009 and Beyond,” in The Obama Administration and the Americas: 
Agenda for Change, eds. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2009), 161–165. 
7 
with political egos to actually invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which 
would force an OAS resolution against Venezuela. The United States should instead 
reach out to other regional and international partners that may have more influence.19  
While the idea by both authors to engage the international community is an important 
one, it is too early to give up hope on the OAS.   
By and large, the most consistent recommendations on U.S. foreign policy have 
come from Congressional Research Service (CSR) reports, many of which are put 
together by Mark P. Sullivan. Since the early 2000s, Sullivan has continually highlighted 
the importance of preserving democracy, keeping access to Venezuelan oil reserves, and 
continuing counternarcotics operations.20  In 2005, the importance of guerilla groups’ 
crossing over the border from Colombia also became a focus.21  The main problem with 
CRS Reports is that they do not consider second- or third-order effects that may be 
generated from policy recommendations. They are also designed to provide information 
and not necessarily a specific position. This requires comparisons to actual state actions 
and significant research to attempt to determine correlations.   
Yet another important aspect of the literature is showing that the United States has 
actually lost influence in the region. One could argue that Chávez’s rise occurred 
precisely when the United States was at its weakest in terms of international influence. 
Steve Ellner clarifies why: “Chávez’s denunciations of U.S. imperialism after 2003 
coincided with the widespread recognition of the fragility and vulnerability of U.S. 
economic power, the loss of U.S. prestige as a result of the invasion of Iraq, and the Bush 
administration’s subordination of pressing worldwide economic problems tot the war on 
terrorism.”22  Other indicators of a shift in U.S. influence are present when regional 
organizations either act contrary to U.S. interests or without its presence at all. For 
                                                
 19 Harold Trinkunas, “Venezuela Breaks Down in Violence,” Brookings Institution, uploaded January 23, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/venezuela-breaks-down-violence-trinkunas. 
20 K. Larry Storrs et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Legislative Issues in 2001 (CRS Report No. RL30971) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2001), 16. 
21 Mark P. Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL32488) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2005), 12–13. 
22 Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics, 202. 
8 
example, the OAS opted to incorporate Cuba, the long-time rival of the United States, in 
2009.23  Challenging the United States on both economic and political fronts, Venezuela 
has also helped create or partake in two political and economic regional organizations. 
Although the presence of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) alone does not necessarily 
signify a weaker United States, the fact that they endure to this day demonstrates that 
they do provide something that the United States cannot.24  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Because of the complexity of defining U.S. foreign policy with Venezuela over a 
14-year period, the thesis will spend a significant amount of time comparing official 
documents that were presented during both the Bush and Obama administrations. The 
analysis will include CRS Reports for Congress, posture statements from the Commander 
of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Deputy Assistant Security 
of Defense (DASD) for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), and Congressional 
Testimonies among other publicly available documents. The proposal will then compare 
and contrast the statements over time in an effort to find a single, whole-of-government 
policy. Gaps and inconsistencies will be highlighted as potential causes for loss of U.S. 
influence throughout Latin America. Having defined the stated intentions of the U.S. 
government, the proposal will move on to analyzing actions undertaken by the United 
States, including economic sanctions, withdraw and expulsion of diplomats, adherence to 
extradition requests, and other non-economic actions. The intent of this analysis is to find 
out whether or not the stated U.S. objectives matched the actions. Once again, any 
difference will be highlighted for its possible value in explaining loss of U.S. influence in 
the region thanks to inconsistent policies.     
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With the intentions and actions of the United States toward Venezuela fully 
explored throughout the Chávez and Maduro presidencies, the thesis will utilize the OAS 
as a mechanism for measuring shifts in the balance of U.S. influence in Latin America. 
To do this, it will once again compare and contrast documents produced within the OAS 
over the previously stated 14-year period. Documents to be analyzed will include 
statements from the Summits of the Americas, resolutions and declarations, as well as 
any significant changes to guiding OAS documents such as the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter. As changes occur and priorities shift within the OAS, the thesis will 
search for links to U.S. foreign policy decisions.    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was viewed by some as an irrational, 
eccentric, and inconsistent head of state; it is hard to envision a similar individual leading 
the United States. Yet when one looks at the details, the picture becomes much more 
difficult to comprehend in a single glance. Prior to his death, Chávez led what he termed 
a “Bolivarian Revolution” throughout Latin America. One of his main missions was to 
decrease U.S. influence, but was he successful?  This thesis strives to answer that 
question by specifically analyzing the role of the United States within the OAS and how 
that role changed between 2000 and 2014 as a result of its foreign policies toward 
Venezuela. It will begin with a brief background of Chávez and Venezuelan politics 
followed by a thorough review of significant moments in Venezuela’s domestic situation 
between 2000 and 2014. The focus will then shift in Chapter III to the United States as 
the proposal attempts to find consistency within U.S. foreign policy as it relates to 
Venezuela. Chapter IV observes the regional institution of the OAS and how it has 
changed since its inception in an effort to identify shifts in influence. The thesis will 
conclude with the argument that the United States has lost influence within Latin 
America, measured by its decreased influence within the OAS, as a result of its foreign 
policy toward Venezuela.  
10 
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II. VENEZUELA’S BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1800s, South America saw the emergence of a man who would go on 
to become a symbol for an entire region: Simón Bolívar. The importance of Bolívar was 
instantly apparent, when in 1825 the Peruvian politician José Domingo Choquehuana told 
Bolívar, “You are the man of destiny. Nothing that has happened in the past bears any 
resemblance to your accomplishments. To imitate you, it would be necessary once again 
to liberate a world.”25  Despite such aspirations for a new age of hope and prosperity for 
all of Latin America, the region experienced substantial variation within and across 
countries for the next 175 years. In 1998, invoking Bolívar’s vision of anti-imperialism 
and Latin American unity, the leader of what would come to be known as the Bolivarian 
Revolution, Hugo Chávez Frías, was elected president of Venezuela.26  To properly 
understand the role of the United States in Latin America in the 2000s, one must also 
understand Venezuela under Chávez and the effects his movement had on the region. 
This chapter will analyze Chávez’s impact on Latin America by first providing 
background on the political context in which Chávez made his transition from soldier to 
politician. It will then highlight key moments in his Bolivarian Revolution and what they 
meant to the region. It will conclude with Chávez’s death and what current Venezuelan 
President Nicolás Maduro does or does not mean in terms of carrying on the legacy. In 
pursuit of their Bolivarian Revolution, both Chávez and Maduro created domestic and 
regional institutions that would serve as challenges for U.S. foreign policy for more than 
a decade. 
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B. CHÁVEZ’S POLITICAL RISE IN CONTEXT 
Chávez’s political rise took part thanks to a series of events dating back some 50 
years. Beginning in 1948, Venezuela transitioned from a democracy to a military 
dictatorship, with General Marcos Pérez Jiménez emerging as its leader in 1952. First on 
the agenda for Pérez Jiménez was to outlaw the previous political parties and open up the 
Venezuelan market, particularly with his Reciprocal Trade Treaty of 1952 with the 
United States. For the next six years, Pérez Jiménez boosted state ownership of 
commodities and attempted to construct a strong national identity within Venezuela, all 
under incredibly repressive rule. It was the suppression of the citizens that ultimately 
united the four opposition parties into the Patriotic Junta in 1957. In what was a rarity for 
Latin America at the time, the Junta combined both communist and democratic parties in 
an effective manner, as evidenced by their abstention of Pérez Jiménez’s plebiscite for 
continued rule in December 1957. The opposition grew strong enough that it was able to 
force Pérez Jiménez to flee the country, leaving his six-year mark as a dictator that 
favored foreign interests over those of his fellow Venezuelans.27   
With the reestablishment of democracy in 1958, Venezuela saw the creation of a 
system that would remain in control until Chávez’s election as president. One of the most 
significant aspects of the new regime was the Punto Fijo Pact, which excluded the 
communist party and solidified COPEI, AD, and the Democratic Republican Union 
(URD) as the three parties that would govern Venezuela. In addition to formalizing the 
three parties as the official parties of Venezuela, the Pact also created a mutual agreement 
for a coalition government, regardless of who won the presidency. Conscious of 
indicators that may have led to tension in the past, the Pact also included top leaders in 
the church, business, and military. As the democracy developed, its first president, 
Rómulo Betancourt, settled into a foreign policy that emulated that of the United States 
thanks to its anti-communist leanings. Among other actions taken by the Venezuelan 
government against Cuba, Betancourt joined the United States in an effort to expel Cuba 
from the OAS in 1962 because of its non-democratic government. Regarding labor 
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unions and the right to mobilize, Betancourt cracked down, limiting the size of and time 
for strikes and protests.28     
For the next 20 years, Venezuelan politics mostly followed down the same path. 
In the early 1970s, however, Carlos Andrés Pérez of the AD became president and moved 
toward a greater state presence in the economy. Perhaps his most important action was 
the nationalization of two of Venezuela’s most important industries: oil and steel. Pérez’s 
intervention in the economy mirrored similar efforts in his foreign policy and social 
development as he moved toward what he hoped would be a form of socialism, calling to 
mind many aspects of the government of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina in the 1930s 
and 1940s.29  By the 1980s, however, declining oil prices and the subsequent economic 
crisis brought significant difficulties for Venezuelan politicians. President Luis Herrera 
Campins of COPEI recognized an upcoming downfall in the early 1980s and attempted to 
reverse Pérez’s economic intervention policies. By cutting back government spending 
and modifying the exchange rate, Campins hoped to slow down growth and reduce 
inflation. By ignoring Venezuela’s reliance on foreign financial institutions, however, the 
country ventured further into debt. The following president brought more of the same as 
Venezuela seemed unable to recover from the crisis.30 
Hoping to provide the much-needed solution, new president Carlos Andrés Pérez 
of the AD set about enacting neoliberal reforms almost immediately following his 
election in 1989. His efforts had drastic unforeseen consequences and on February 27, 
1989, two days of mass looting was responded to with military force in what came to be 
known as the Caracazo. While Pérez pushed forward with the reforms, the informal 
economy increased and the political power of organized labor decreased. The popular 
social discontent in Venezuela helped lead Chávez to a coup attempt in 1992, discussed 
below. Even after a similar coup attempt in November 1992 by the Air Force, Pérez was 
able to retain power. In an effort to show his ability to be flexible and support the public, 
he made several appointments of independents outside of the AD. As disillusion grew 
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between Pérez and his own political party, so, too, did the people grow disillusioned with 
both the AD and COPEI.31  By the time the 1998 election came around, both the AD and 
COPEI were near collapse and the situation was ripe for someone like Chávez to come 
around and win the popular vote.   
C. CHÁVEZ THE SOLDIER 
Hugo Chávez Frías was born on July 28, 1954, to a family with a long tradition of 
taking seriously education, military, and politics. His father, Hugo de los Reyes Chávez, 
was a teacher, member of the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI), and beginning in 
November 1998, governor of the state of Barinas. His brother, Adán Chávez, was a 
university professor in Mérida and member of the Constituent Assembly in 1999, and is 
the current governor of Barinas (2008–present). Military tradition dates back to Chávez 
senior’s great-grandfather, Colonel Pedro Pérez Pérez, who fought as a guerrilla in the 
Sovereign Army of the People against the Venezuelan oligarchy in the 1840s. Colonel 
Pérez’s son–Hugo Chávez’s great grandfather–was General Pedro Pérez Delgado, also 
known as Maisanta. In his youth, Chávez was told stories by his grandmother about how 
Maisanta was nothing more than a murderer and a criminal. However, as Chávez aged, he 
began to interpret Maisanta’s rebellion against an oppressive military dictatorship in 1914 
as the work of a freedom fighter, much like the efforts of Bolívar.32     
Chávez’s upbringing and love of history heavily influenced him, and in 1971, he 
enrolled in the Venezuelan army. He was introduced to the idea of blending politics and 
military early on, with one highlight being a 1974 visit to Peru for the 150th anniversary 
of the Battle of Ayacucho. The trip not only commemorated Bolívar’s liberation of Peru, 
but also gave Chávez a glimpse into the regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, a 
Peruvian military officer that had taken power in 1968. Velasco had become a unique 
military leader in the region, establishing progressive reforms and redistributing wealth 
within his country while other military regimes were more focused on consolidating 
power. Chávez’s first years in the army were spent in a counterinsurgency battalion in 
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Barinas combatting members of the insurgent group Red Flag. During his time in 
Barinas, he began to empathize with the guerrillas who fought against a military they 
viewed as corrupt, under the direction of corrupt politicians. The experience ultimately 
led Chávez to form in 1977 a group within the army, the Liberation Army of the 
Venezuelan People (ELPV), as a potential solution to the corruption he had witnessed. 
Early on, he became friends with Jesús Urdaneta Hernández, a fellow officer that 
supported Chávez’s ideals of a movement within the army. In 1982, after years of 
economic downfall and an increase in poverty following the 1973 oil boom, Chávez 
chose a military solution for the political problem and created within the army the 
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200 (MBR-200), named in honor of Bolívar’s 200th 
birthday. Chávez, Urdaneta, and Felipe Acosta Carles, all lecturers at the military 
academy at the time, swore to uphold the goals of Bolívar and to fight until the oppressed 
had been liberated.33    
The next ten years saw the development of the MBR-200 and further 
disillusionment of the military with the government. As civil-military relations decreased 
and the military grew tired of an increased role in internal security, then Colonel Chávez 
chose to intervene and the MBR-200 attempted a military coup d’état on February 4, 
1992.34  One of the key additions to the movement was Francisco Javier Arias Cárdenas, 
who joined in March 1985. Although he did not have the same charming personality that 
Chávez had, Cárdenas would come to serve as one of the movement’s leading 
intellectuals.35  By the time the coup was set to take place, Chávez, Urdaneta, and Arias 
Cárdenas were all in charge of regiments. Although a solid plan appeared to be in place, 
the coup attempt ultimately failed. The reasons for failure are many, but include lack of 
civilian support, a betrayal from within the movement that gave the military an early 
warning, and only sporadic success throughout the country.36  Deciding to abandon the 
coup, Chávez requested to speak on television to disseminate the message to his fellow 
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commanders. His appearance not only gave the movement a face, it also gave a message 
of hope to the people of Venezuela: 
First I want to say “good morning” to all the people of Venezuela, but this 
Bolivarian message is directed specifically to the courageous soldiers of 
the parachute regiment of Aragua and the tank regiment of Valencia. 
Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set 
ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That’s to say that those of 
us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you 
have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities 
will arise again and the country will be able to move definitively toward a 
better future. 
So listen to what I have to say, listen to comandante Chávez who is 
sending you this message, and, please, think deeply. Lay down your arms, 
for in truth the objectives that we set ourselves at a national level are not 
within our grasp. 
Comrades, listen to this message of solidarity. I am grateful for your 
loyalty, for your courage, and for your selfless generosity; before the 
country and before you, I alone shoulder the responsibility for this 
Bolivarian military uprising. Thank you.37   
As can be expected, Chávez received a long prison term for his role in leading the 
coup attempt. That said, he only served just over two years, February 1992 to March 
1994, and immediately following the coup, President Rafael Caldera chose to address the 
underlying causes of the attempt rather than to denounce: “A military coup, whatever 
form it takes, must be censured and condemned; yet it would be naïve to think this was an 
event in which a handful of ambitious men threw themselves rashly into an adventure, on 
their account, without being aware of the wider implications of their action. There was a 
set of circumstances here, a backcloth to these developments, which is the serious 
situation in which the country finds itself. If this situation is not dealt with, the future may 
yet hold unpleasant surprises for us all.”38 
Chávez used his time in prison to develop his ideology and to take advantage of 
an evolving political situation in the country. Through radio interviews and prison visits, 
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he distributed a message of social equality and democracy while concurrently building 
political affiliations with emerging parties. Meanwhile, the traditional ruling parties of 
Venezuela, Democratic Action (AD) and COPEI, were in decline with new, left-leaning 
parties such as La Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) gaining popular 
support.39  After his release from prison, Chávez continued to travel and make political 
allies until, in April 1997, he formally made the shift from soldier to politician, 
announcing his intention to run for president in the 1998 elections. Maintaining much of 
the structure of MBR-200, he created the formal political party of the Fifth Republic 
Movement (MVR) in July 1997. Alluding as always to the ideals of Bolívar, the Fifth 
Republic would aspire to be the place Bolívar had dreamed about and would stand as the 
first fresh start to democracy in 140 years. Chávez’s personality was critical during his 
campaign, and many parties began to jump on the Chávez bandwagon. The first major 
show of support came from the Fatherland for Everyone (PPT) party, a branch of La 
Causa R, and was shortly followed by MAS. The strength of PPT and MAS combined 
with the MVR gave Chávez the support he needed, and in December 1998, he received 
56.20 percent of the votes, enough to win the election.40      
D. MVR PUSHES FOR CHANGE 
Having finally achieved victory, it was time for Chávez to deliver on his 
promises. Venezuela was among the first Latin American states to democratize, making 
the transition in 1958, but for Chávez and the members of the MVR, simply carrying the 
title of democracy was not enough. Social unrest had grown significantly in the 1980s 
and 1990s throughout Venezuela thanks to numerous coup attempts, a growing poverty 
level, and natural oil revenue going to the elites. The country was ready for a change and 
Chávez’s allusions to a Bolivarian Revolution seemed to ring true with much of the 
populace, particularly the poor. From the outset Chávez outlined a plan to rewrite the 
constitution of 1961 and to use the armed forces as a source for social good, not just for 
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the standard national defense strategy of an army. To implement his plan, however, he 
needed to legislative support so he held elections for a National Constituent Assembly in 
July 1999. Not surprisingly, given the affiliations he had built throughout his campaign 
and the support the MVR had from the masses, Chávez supporters were elected to 119 
out of 131 seats in the Assembly. Choosing not to completely dissolve the previous 
government structure, Chávez and the Assembly also had to determine the role of the old 
Congress, made up of a senate and a chamber of deputies. After an initial period of 
disagreement, the Congress agreed not to include any provisions in the new constitution 
that would give it the ability to restrict the Assembly.41   
With legislative affairs reformed, Chávez and the Assembly then moved their 
attention to the judiciary. Upon taking office, corruption was rampant in the judicial 
system, and some 23,000 citizens were in prison without ever receiving a trial.42  To 
correct the problem, the government established a Judicial Nominations Committee that 
would review the candidates for Supreme Court judges before passing the list to the 
Citizen Power for consideration. Under the new constitution, the Citizen Power would be 
made up of the attorney general, comptroller, and public defender. The Citizen Power 
would then shorten the list, which would be forwarded to the Assembly for final 
approval. The process was designed with layers to prevent selection of judges through 
corrupt officials or bribes. The reforms as detailed in the new constitution did not 
necessarily come together as planned, with less participatory democracy and more power 
in the Assembly, as it elected both the Citizen Power and the judges.43   
Throughout the reform process, Chávez continually stressed the role of the people 
in the government, both in rhetoric and practice. As a symbol of the faith the government 
purportedly held in the citizens, the new constitution also included a system of 
referendums that would allow for the removal of elected officials with sufficient votes. 
The so-called “constituent-power” would be more powerful than any other branch of 
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government. Although the people were given more power in the government, Chávez 
also gave more power to himself as the executive. Whereas the people could only call an 
assembly for a referendum and potential recall of an elected official with at least 20 
percent of the registered voters, Chávez could call a constituent assembly with a decree in 
the Council of Ministers.44  This gave Chávez the ability to challenge the authority of any 
elected official while challenging his authority would be much more difficult.  
Chávez had not forgotten the military in his initiative to change Venezuela and 
created what was known as Plan Bolívar 2000. Deploying troops for social causes, he 
battled problems such as sanitation, health, public transport, and housing. The plan was 
designed to both solve domestic problems while also shining a positive light on a military 
that was known for repression. Unfortunately for Chávez, the move caused dissent among 
the ranks as some soldiers felt they were being used for a mission outside of their 
training. Making matters more difficult, Chávez’s decentralization campaign also created 
problems for civil-military relations as military officers now found themselves directly 
responsible for the budgets that were to be used for social development, as opposed to 
acting under the guidance of a mayor or governor as was the case previously.45  These 
same problems would arise again in 2002 and serve as a catalyzing force in the coup 
attempt against Chavez. 
By the year 2000, Chávez had put in place many of the reforms he had planned, 
but the intended outcomes of the reforms were yet to be achieved, and opposition was on 
the rise. Polarization between political parties grew as differences that were put aside to 
either support or oppose Chávez in the 1998 election became more evident. Even some 
supporters of Chávez doubted his legitimacy as he continued to put forth anti-neoliberal 
rhetoric while often supporting the open global market. For example, he openly opposed 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement in 2001 and yet did not break 
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Venezuela’s economic ties with the United States. Recognizing the need to demonstrate 
follow-through on his rhetoric, Chávez embarked on significant economic reforms in 
November 2001. The package of 49 laws would try in earnest to break free from the 
neoliberalism of the 1990s. Including such items as land reform, new fishing laws, state-
controlled social security, and government ownership of oil, he hoped to decrease the 
power of private corporations and increase the power of the state. Using an emergency 
authority, Chávez passed the reforms without the approval of the Assembly.46    
E. THE COUP OF 2002 AND CHÁVEZ’S RESPONSE 
The massive reforms validated one of Chávez’s key campaign points from 1998 
of breaking free from neoliberalism, but they also served as the tipping point for intense 
polarization resulting in a 2002 coup that briefly removed him from office. Where certain 
sectors within MAS and MVR were willing to put up with Chávez’s reforms in 1998 
through 2000, the reforms in 2001 seemed to give Chávez unchecked power. Those who 
shifted away from Chávez included his old friend and partner Francisco Arias Cárdenas, 
who at the time was heading the Union Party.47  It seemed as though the situation would 
soon be untenable, and in a March 2002 CRS report, the staff wrote that, “critics and 
other observers have raised concerns about his (Chávez) government and fear that the 
President is moving toward authoritarian rule with his domination of most government 
institutions.”48  The same report also identified that Chávez’s powerful opposition, 
mostly consisting of political parties, unions, and business leaders, was further separating 
itself from Chávez and his supporters, who at this time consisted of several different 
political parties, unions, business leaders, and the poor.49  At the forefront of the 
powerful opposition were the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers and Associations of 
Commerce and Production (FEDECAMARAS), headed by Pedro Carmona, and the 
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Venezuelan Workers’ Confederation (CTV), led by Carlos Ortega.50  Following a 
successful strike in early 2002 through which oil workers earned higher pay, the 
opposition sensed weakness in the Chávez regime. CTV, backed by FEDECAMARAS, 
ordered several more strikes in April of the same year. The strikes proved only minimally 
successful and the opposition moved for mass demonstrations. Luckily for the opposition, 
they also had an ally in the media as the major television corporations within Venezuela 
were led by elites who opposed Chávez. What began as a well-coordinated mass 
demonstration at the headquarters of Petroleum of Venezuela, Joint Stock Company 
(PDVSA)—one of the leading oil companies—became a large-scale march on the 
presidential palace. The opposition, in a calculated plan, had garnered enough popular 
support in the streets to challenge Chávez’s presidency.51  On April 11, 2002, the military 
forcefully removed Chávez from office. 
One immediate trigger for the coup was the turn of the demonstrations from 
peaceful to violent. It is hard to say what instigated what, but at a certain point during the 
march on the presidential palace shots were exchanged between Chávez supporters and 
the opposition. By the end of the day, dozens were dead and up to 100 were wounded. To 
stop the crisis, the opposition demanded the resignation of Chávez. The opposition owned 
much of the non-state media in Venezuela and used it to show mostly images of violent 
assaults by the Chávez regime against peaceful protesters.52  Perhaps one of the best 
glimpses of what was really happening during the coup attempt is the film The Revolution 
Will Not Be Televised. Although the film is biased toward Chávez, it does provide a 
glimpse into the confusion and shock within the Chávez regime and the presidential 
palace during the coup. Of particular interest is the ease at which the high command of 
the military was willing to go along with the coup and move Chávez to a detention 
facility.53  The man that had built his career as a revolutionary military officer and coup 
leader was now seeing events unfold from the other side.    
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Almost just as quickly as he had been removed, Chávez was returned to power, on 
April 13. Such a quick change can partially be attributed to the actions by the interim 
regime, headed by Pedro Carmona, the president of FEDECAMARAS. In what appeared 
to be a deliberate plan to return Venezuela to its pre-Chávez state, Carmona appointed to 
key positions several individuals from the Rafael Caldera regime, the government 
preceding Chávez. Carmona took several actions to remain in power. For example, he 
gave two important defense positions—including the post of Defense Minister—to the 
navy and not the army in hopes of breaking up support for Chávez and for army general 
Efraín Vásquez Velasco, one of the coup leaders.   Further distancing himself from 
representatives of the Chávez government, Carmona appointed a right-wing Opus Dei 
foreign minister and refused to meet with Congress. Using the deaths on April 11th as a 
justification to charge Chávez and many of his supporters, and having restructured the 
government in one day, Carmona was on pace to enact his plan to steer the country 
toward neoliberal reforms. Unfortunately for Carmona, his inability to garner support 
from the people, refusal to incorporate the same army leaders that helped in the coup, and 
his aggressive reforms proved to be too much, and on April 13, the military and the 
citizens of Venezuela brought Chávez back to power.54  
The U.S. government also had a role in the coup. By late 2001, relations between 
the United States and Venezuela had soured. Chávez had denounced the U.S. bombings 
of Afghanistan (which themselves were in response to the September 11, 2001, bombings 
of the World Trade Center). Amid polarization in Venezuela, U.S. officials and the 
government-financed National Endowment for Democracy (NED) met with opposition 
leaders. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular knew that the opposition 
was attempting to exploit unrest as a justification for arresting Chávez. There was also a 
significant change in NED funding between 2000 and 2001 as Venezuela rose to become 
the fifth largest recipient in the region. Much of these funds were allotted to the same 
opposition groups that marched against Chávez and supported Carmona in 2002. In the 
aftermath of the coup, Chávez alleged that U.S. military ships that had been stationed off 
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the coast of Venezuela during the crisis were there for the purpose of providing 
information to the opposition.55   
The U.S. government was quick to recognize Carmona’s government as 
legitimate.56  Just one day after Chávez’s removal from office, the U.S. Department of 
State released an official press statement blaming the changeover in government on the 
Chávez government’s suppression of peaceful demonstrations and claiming that Chávez 
had dismissed the Vice President and his Cabinet and had resigned.57  The U.S. 
government stood alone in its position. Several foreign ministers who had been on scene 
at the presidential palace during the coup stated at the time that Chávez was not resigning 
and that he was being forcibly removed by a coup. Chávez himself said, “we’re not gone 
yet,” as he was being escorted away by the military to a detention center.58  While there 
is not yet clear evidence that the U.S. government was behind the 2002 coup plot, the 
groups that the United States funded prior to the coup and its recognition of the Carmona 
regime would go on to embolden Chávez in his anti-U.S. imperialism messaging once he 
returned to power, as explored further in the next chapter. 
Back in power, to strengthen his position, Chávez almost immediately created the 
Presidential Commission for a National Dialogue, which brought together members of 
the opposition and government in an effort to reduce tensions. He also implemented the 
decentralization plan from the 1999 Constitution and reinstated seven key executives for 
multiple oil companies that he had fired just before the coup. Despite his efforts, Chávez 
did not win over the opposition, which had garnered enough support to challenge Chávez 
in a recall election. When the vote was held on August 15, 2004, 59 percent of the voters 
favored Chávez remaining in office. Though international organizations such as the 
Carter Center and the Organization of American States deemed the election fair, the 
opposition claimed fraud based on a report from Súmate, a non-governmental 
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organization headed by María Corina Machado. Machado and Súmate, one of the 
principal recipients of the U.S. NED funds, were both discredited by Chávez as U.S. tools 
of influence. In the meantime, much of the opposition refused to vote in the October 31, 
2004, mayoral-gubernatorial elections due to the impression that there would be fraud 
and retribution from Chavez. As a result, Chávez supporters won in all but two states. 
Having at least attempted to provide concessions to the opposition, won more legitimacy 
in the recall vote, and secured support nation-wide in the October elections, Chávez was 
now free to push forward with more radical reforms.59  
F. CHÁVEZ CONSOLIDATES POWER 
The next decade of rule under Chávez saw unprecedented developments in what 
is now known as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Following a similar strategy as 
was used in the October 2004 elections, the opposition boycotted the December 2005 
congressional elections. Although the move did bring negative international attention to 
Chávez, it also gave him absolute control of the National Assembly. Already having 
declared Venezuela as anti-imperialist in 2004, he could now strengthen what he called 
“socialism for the 21st century.”  Eight primary tenets of this new form of politics were 
social missions, worker cooperatives, co-management, government expropriation, land 
distribution, strict tax enforcement, delegation of authority to community organizations, 
and rejection of links to organized business interests. Chávez’s hope was to improve 
social welfare and to use popular support to increase his control. The new plan also gave 
Chávez an opportunity to deny U.S. influence in the country, while promoting his 
economic policies in South America. Through deepened ties with Cuba, he brought 
thousands of Cuban doctors and educators to countries in the region to perform services 
for the poor.60  
Consolidating power not only meant improving popular support. It also meant 
further weakening powerful institutions within Venezuela. To do so, Chávez began to 
redistribute land from major foreign landowners as well as expropriating industries that 
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the government deemed mismanaged. By strictly enforcing tax laws, particularly on 
foreign investors, he was also able to seize assets from major international companies 
such as General Motors and Hewlett-Packard.   
Having increased state control, decreased foreign influence within Venezuela, and 
brought services to his people, an emboldened Chávez won reelection in December 2006. 
The government then began to encroach on public sectors, buying controlling shares of 
major telephone and electricity companies CANTV and Caracas Electricity. He similarly 
strengthened PDVSA’s dominance in the oil sector, transferring employees of major 
mixed ownership companies under the state’s payroll. The changes also occurred within 
the government as Chávez consolidated multiple supporter groups into one singular party, 
the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).61      
Perhaps Chávez’s most drastic proposed changes came in the form of a 2007 
constitutional referendum. In August 2007, the president announced a constitutional 
reform that would change 33 of the 350 articles of the Venezuelan resolution. According 
to Chávez, the changes would help him increase the redistribution of wealth to the poor 
and give more political power to Venezuelans. After the National Assembly came to a 
conclusion regarding the proposals, the amendments and 69 final reforms were split into 
two separate voting blocks, to be voted on in a public referendum on December 2, 2007. 
Included in the final reforms was an amendment that would extend the presidential term 
from six to seven years and that would abolish the presidential two-term limit. After a 
previous five years of increasing popular support of Chávez, one would have expected 
both blocks of the referendum to pass. Instead, both failed, with a mere 50.65 percent 
voting “no” for Block A and 51.01 percent rejecting Block B. One possible explanation 
for the loss is that only 56 percent of the electorate voted, as opposed to the 75 percent 
that voted in the December 2006 presidential election. Another potential explanation is 
that the reforms were too radical, even for a population that had largely welcomed the 
changes Chávez brought to Venezuela. It was viewed as Chávez’s first true democratic 
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defeat, but he would pass through several of the reforms he deemed most important by 
presidential decree months later.62 
In 2008, Chávez continued on an unprecedented strategy of expropriating 
corporations. His control of major basic industry sectors served not only as a means of 
controlling the state economy, but also as a punishment for opposition investors. By 
constantly attacking opposition leaders, Chávez needed the support of the people to 
remain in control and he continued to push for social development and what appeared to 
be decentralized government. Through the promotion of labor unions and the 
development of community councils, the common poor laborer still had reason to believe 
that Chávez was acting in their best interest.63  His efforts worked and on February 15, 
2009, and with a 70 percent voter turnout, the two-term limit for presidency was revoked, 
meaning Chávez could run again for office in 2012.64  
G. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
Following the 2002 coup, Chávez not only consolidated his power domestically, 
he also developed his reputation among other Latin America leaders for opposing U.S. 
influence in the region. Recognizing reduced support in the region for the United States 
after the latter’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, Chávez immediately began denouncing U.S. 
imperialism. Prior to that point, Chávez often steered away from publicly denouncing the 
United States and instead promoted the idea of a multi-polar world, but after implications 
of U.S. support for the 2002 coup and an invasion into the Middle East, a region where 
Chávez had many allies, he changed his stance. First on Chávez’s list was an extension of 
his petro-diplomacy, based on Venezuela’s massive amounts of crude oil. In June 2005, 
Chávez signed an agreement with 13 Caribbean countries, including Cuba, to create 
PetroCaribe, a discounted oil pact. The deal greatly increased Venezuela’s presence in the 
region, creating not only economic stimulation, but also favoritism from national leaders 
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that benefitted from the cheap oil. Utilizing the now more powerful state-owned PDVSA, 
Chávez also sought out development projects abroad, creating plans for refineries and gas 
lines in other countries, including Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina. Similar intentions led to 
the creation of PetroSur as well, the South American version of PetroCaribe.65  
Oil was not the only arena in which Chávez sought influence in the region. Part of 
Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution also consisted of attempting to unite and integrate all of 
Latin America.66  Rather than working through the OAS, what Chávez viewed as a tool 
of the United States, he created the Bolivarian Alternative for America (ALBA). 
Launched initially in 2005, ALBA was a pact between Venezuela and Cuba that included 
some 49 trade and cooperation agreements as well as educational exchanges. In 2006, 
and perhaps as a result of PetroCaribe and PetroSur, Ecuador and several Caribbean 
states joined in. ALBA also served as a direct challenge to the U.S. FTAA and the World 
Bank, going against the standard neoliberal economic strategy. ALBA extended into non-
economic sectors as well, addressing issues such as immigration and national 
sovereignty.67   
Recognizing that he was not alone in his quest to oppose the United States, 
Chávez also teamed up with MERCOSUR. In particular, MERCOSUR and Chávez were 
united in their desires to oppose the FTAA. In 2005, anti-American moves were perhaps 
at their high point as Chávez found himself surrounded by leftist Latin American leaders 
such as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Néstor Kirchner in Argentina. Although 
Venezuela was not officially part of MERCOSUR until 2012, Chávez carried significant 
pull among his peers and was able to garner support in his efforts against the FTAA. The 
plan came to a head at the Fourth Summit of the Americas in November 2005 when 
Venezuela and the MERCOSUR members denied U.S. President Bush’s attempts at 
renegotiating over the FTAA.   
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Although Chávez did have allies across the region, he also had enemies. He 
verbally attacked Mexican President Vicente Fox and Peruvian President Alan García on 
multiple occasions. At the same Summit of the Americas meeting in 2005, Chávez called 
Fox a “puppy dog of the U.S. empire.”  Similarly, Chávez played a heavy role in Peru’s 
June 2006 runoff election. Presidential candidate Alan García had come to a runoff 
election with leftist candidate Ollanta Humala. García accused Chávez of imposing his 
candidate on the people of Peru, to which Chávez called García a bandit.68 
H. VENEZUELA POST-CHÁVEZ 
After winning reelection in 2006 and the vote to lift term limits in 2009, President 
Chávez was reelected in 2012. Due to an ongoing battle with cancer, Chávez’s run was 
finally cut short. He died on March 5, 2013.69  He left serious challenges for future 
Venezuelan governments. From 2010 until the present, the country has seen economic 
contraction resulting from a drop in oil prices, high inflation from the ever-high state 
spending, and significant capital flight due to investor doubt in the Venezuelan 
economy.70  Other legacies that have been criticized by the United States and members of 
the international community such as the UN include human rights violations, threats to 
freedom of expression, and a weak stance toward intercepting illegal drug trafficking 
along Venezuela’s 1,370-mile border with Colombia.71  While Chávez was able to 
downplay many of these issues, the same cannot be said for his handpicked replacement, 
President Nicolás Maduro. Maduro, a former legislator from 1998 to 2006, National 
Assembly president from 2005 to 2006, and foreign minister from 2006 until 2012, was 
inaugurated on October 13, 2012. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, the vice 
president would become president in the absence of Chávez until a new election could 
take place. Chávez was set to be inaugurated on January 10, 2013, even in his poor 
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health, but on January 8, Maduro announced that the swearing in would have to be 
postponed until a later date. Maduro was formally elected president on April 13, 2013.72 
Polarization continued to grow within Venezuela as the Democratic Unity 
Roundtable (MUD) and even members within the Maduro’s United Socialist Party 
(PSUV) itself began to distance themselves from Maduro. There were talks of a rivalry 
between Maduro and National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, who carried the 
support of the military. Additionally, the economy began to shrink once again, with 
Venezuela now facing incredibly high inflation, an overvalued currency, and a rapidly 
depleting international reserve. In an attempt to solve some of his problems, Maduro 
removed multiple mid-level officials of the opposition from the National Assembly 
through accusations of corruption. Efforts to stop crime by using the military in May 
2013 backfired and human rights groups chastised the plan as encouraging a military 
solution to a domestic problem.73  The social and political challenges were not enough to 
prevent Maduro from receiving similar decree powers as Chávez, as determined by a 
three-fifths vote by the National Assembly in November 2013. Hopes of a sweep in the 
municipal elections were dashed on December 8 as the PSUV only won 242 of the 335 
offices, losing to the MUD in two of the largest states and four of the five municipalities 
of Caracas.74   
Violence and economic problems continued to grow with civil unrest reaching a 
breaking point on January 7, 2014, following the murder former Miss Venezuela Monica 
Spear and her husband. What began as a peaceful student protest over crime in February 
turned violent when government security forces attacked the students. In the first protest, 
two students and a pro-government leader were killed. The outrage spurred more protests 
across Venezuela, this time encompassing many of the problems faced by civil society, 
including for example corruption and human rights violations. As of mid-April, at least 
41 had been killed, more than 650 injured, and over 2,000 detained. Included in the 
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detentions was opposition leader Leopoldo López, a well-known MUD member. 
Recognizing an opportunity to create change, the MUD began to call for Maduro’s 
resignation. Both the OAS and the Obama administration called for peaceful negotiations 
between Maduro and the opposition. Panama in particular asked for a special meeting of 
the OAS on February 27, leading to Maduro’s suspension of diplomatic ties with Panama 
on March 5. The OAS finally met on March 7, but much to the dismay of the United 
States, the subsequent resolution highlighted the principle of non-intervention and 
supported Maduro. Only the United States, Panama, and Canada opposed the resolution. 
Just over two weeks later, on March 21, Panama once again raised the issue at the OAS, 
this time having made Venezuelan National Assembly member Maria Corina Machado a 
special member of its delegation. The OAS rejected Panama’s request and Machado was 
stripped of her National Assembly position for her actions. The Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), a regional organization with a similar mission to that of the OAS, 
also met on March 12 and approved a resolution supporting Maduro. By April, UNASUR 
had begun to lead negotiations between Maduro and the opposition, using the church as 
an intermediary.75   
In his article Venezuela Breaks Down in Violence, Harold Trinkunas attributes the 
unrest primarily to Maduro’s mismanagement of the economy.76  Alongside economic 
failures, however, Venezuela is also a politically polarized state. For example, María 
Corina Machado, leader of Súmate and key player in the 2002 coup, is still at the helm of 
the protests. Considering her organization continues to be heavily funded by the U.S. 
government and that she has personally met with the White House regarding the current 
unrest, it would seem she still has an important role in the opposition against Maduro.77  
President Maduro himself recognizes the familiar foes in his April 1, 2014, piece for the 
New York Times: 
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In the United States, the protesters have been described as “peaceful,” 
while the Venezuelan government is said to be violently repressing them. 
According to this narrative, the American government is siding with the 
people of Venezuela; in reality, it is on the side of the 1 percent who wish 
to drag our country back to when the 99 percent were shut out of political 
life and only the few—including American companies—benefitted from 
Venezuela’s oil.  
Let’s not forget that some of those who supported ousting Venezuela’s 
democratically elected government in 2002 are leading the protests today. 
Those involved in the 2002 coup immediately disbanded the Supreme 
Court and the legislature, and scrapped the Constitution. Those who incite 
violence and attempt similar unconstitutional actions today must face the 
justice system.78   
The similarities between modern day and the past are striking, not only if we 
consider the 2002 coup, but also with regard to the 1992 coup attempts. Further research 
should be conducted to compare the actions taken by both the regime and the opposition 
in each case. Chávez’s concessions to the opposition put them at bay for 12 years, but 
they did not completely solve the problem as a similar situation presents itself today.   
Maduro is by no means Chávez. Although the policies of the two leaders are 
fairly similar, the difference in personality is damning for Maduro. Unfortunately for the 
United States, the damage has already been done. Thanks to the groundwork laid by 
Chávez, Maduro can refer to nearly any domestic problem as a result of the United States 
meddling in Venezuelan affairs. Opposition to the FTAA, emergence of groups like 
PetroCaribe and ALBA, and a more influential MERCOSUR can all partially be 
attributed to an effective policy campaign led by Chávez. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the United States has often struggled with how to respond to the policies of a 
country where both action and inaction are viewed as negative external influence.  
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III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND VENEZUELA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On February 3, 2006, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld compared 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías to Adolf Hitler, at a National Press Club 
appearance. Speaking about challenges faced by the United States in Latin America, 
Rumsfeld said, “I mean, we’ve got Chavez in Venezuela with a lot of oil money. He’s a 
person who was elected legally—just as Adolf Hitler was elected legally—and then 
consolidated power and now is, of course, working closely with Fidel Castro and Mr. 
Morales and others.”79  Derogatory comments by state officials on both sides were 
surprisingly common at the time and in combination with ongoing strong economic 
relations between the two countries, are indicative of the complex relationship that exists 
between them. To better understand the impact of economic and diplomatic efforts by the 
United States toward Venezuela between 2000 and 2014 on U.S. influence in Latin 
America, this chapter will highlight key U.S. policy choices during the 14 years of 
interaction. As source material, the chapter considers more than 100 documents created in 
Washington over the time period, including Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
reports, posture statements from commanders of U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM), Director of National Intelligence reports, and many congressional 
testimonies. The chapter will present a chronological description of important events in 
the relationship up until April 2014, resulting both from bilateral and international 
developments, and how the United States responded.   It will then conclude with the 
argument that the United States has pursued a primary strategy of continuing access to 
Venezuela’s natural resources with secondary goals of inhibiting terrorism, drug-
trafficking, and human rights violations.     
                                                




B. THE UNITED STATES MEETS CHÁVEZ 
Prior to the election of Chávez in 1998, the United States had enjoyed close 
relations with Venezuela due to the latter’s vast oil reserves. In 2001, Venezuela was still 
considered a key player in U.S. diplomacy in Latin America and was included in 
President George W. Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). Differing from the U.S.-
Colombian Plan Colombia of the late 1990s–2000s, which focused primarily on military 
and counter-drug assistance, the ARI placed equal importance on economic and social 
programs in an effort to target not just coca crops and guerrillas, but also underlying 
developmental problems. In this program, Venezuela would receive $10.5 million in 
FY2002. Additionally, Venezuela expressed interest in 2001 in joining the Andean Trade 
Preference Act (ATPA), implemented in 1991. The ATPA gave preferential treatment to 
certain U.S. imports in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.80  At this point, even 
though the United States had some uncertainty regarding Chávez and his new 
constitution, mutual cooperation appeared to be possible. Toward the end of the year, 
however, Chávez became less favorable toward the United States as the latter embarked 
on an early military campaign in Afghanistan. In November 2001, The United States 
recalled its ambassador to Venezuela in response to disparaging remarks Chávez had 
made about U.S. government actions in the Middle East.81 
In 2002, the relationship between the United States and Venezuela began to 
deteriorate, in large part due to the April 12th coup that temporarily ousted Chávez.82  The 
first official statement to come out of Washington regarding the incident was an April 12 
press release by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman for the Department of State. In the 
statement, Reeker claimed that the Chávez administration brought the situation upon 
itself through its undemocratic actions, and that Chávez had resigned.83  These two points 
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are important because they signify the beginning of a shift between the policies of the 
United States and those of the rest of Latin America. The vast majority of countries both 
in the region and around the world expressed solidarity with Chávez and specifically 
declared the event as an unlawful coup, not a resignation. The United States would 
ultimately shift its opinion slightly, siding with an Organization of American States 
(OAS) resolution that denounced the change of constitutional order.84   
By early 2003, an opposition-led general strike in Venezuela was hurting the 
country’s oil exports, a concern for the United States, as some 14 percent of total U.S. oil 
imports in 2001 came from Venezuela. Chávez also strongly opposed any U.S. actions in 
Iraq on the grounds that they would violate both Iraq’s sovereignty and international law. 
In response, Chávez began threatening to modify Venezuela’s exports accordingly. 
Recognizing bilateral negotiations were unlikely to influence the Chávez regime, Bush 
looked toward the OAS. In addition to supporting OAS-led resolution meetings between 
Chávez and his domestic opposition that had been ongoing in Venezuela since October 
2002, the United States also helped create the Friends of Venezuela, a coalition of some 
OAS members including the United States, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, as well as Spain 
and Portugal, to facilitate negotiations between Chávez and his striking opposition.85  
The efforts proved fruitful; on February 18, Chávez and the opposition signed an OAS-
facilitated Non-Violence Agreement. Nevertheless, the Chávez regime continued to arrest 
opposition leaders, a move that the Bush administration criticized. Consistently critical of 
Chávez, the United States also remained constant in its support for the OAS and the 
OAS’ role in the negotiations.86   
The OAS continued to play an important role in Venezuelan affairs. In May 2003, 
Chávez agreed to a mid-term presidential recall referendum, which was ultimately held 
on August 15, 2004. Chávez won with 59.3 percent of the vote in what the OAS and 
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Carter Center deemed a fair, legitimate vote. Once again, the Bush administration praised 
the OAS while also stressing that Chávez should include the opposition in future political 
decisions.87  By this point, however, CRS reports identified what would become a 
difficult future with Chávez: “A dilemma for U.S. policymakers has been how to press 
the Chávez government to adhere to democratic principles without taking sides in 
Venezuela’s polarized political conflict.”88  In the lead-up to the referendum, for 
example, Chávez declared that not only was the United States behind his 2002 ouster, but 
the United States was trying to govern Venezuela through the opposition vote in the 
referendum. Even though the U.S. Department of State’s Inspector General reviewed 
U.S. policy toward Venezuela and determined that the U.S. government was not involved 
in the coup, the anti-imperialism rhetoric helped Chávez win the vote and complicated 
U.S. policy options.89  
By the end of 2005, the United States-Venezuela relationship had taken a turn for 
the worst. Boasting an approval rating of 70 percent, Chávez allies won the majority of 
the gubernatorial and municipal positions in October 2004. In a move that backfired, the 
five major opposition parties sat out the December 4, 2005, elections for the National 
Assembly in hopes of attracting international attention to questionable practices by 
Chávez such as requiring fingerprinting to vote. The opposition expected the votes to be 
tracked and the Chávez government subsequently to detain opposition voters. Even 
though the OAS negotiated a deal to not use fingerprinting machines, the opposition still 
abstained, and Chávez supporters won all 167 seats of the National Assembly. An 
increase in world oil prices emboldened Chávez as the Venezuelan economy grew nearly 
18 percent in 2004 and 9 percent in 2005. The extra revenue allowed Chávez to fully 
push for anti-poverty and social programs that made up a large part of his Bolivarian 
revolution.90  With power across all branches of government and popular support, he 
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enacted several laws that drew the attention of international human rights organizations 
and the United States. Among them were laws banning critical coverage of the 
government on the radio and television in December 2004 and an amendment to the 
criminal code in March 2005 that allowed for the punishment of individuals criticizing 
the national government. Chávez also controlled much of the private sector through state 
control over Petroleum of Venezuela (PdVSA), the world’s fifth largest oil exporter, and 
Empresas Polar, Venezuela’s largest food and beer company. In the security realm, 
Venezuela cancelled a bilateral military exchange program with the United States and 
began making significant weapon purchases from Russia.91   
By August 2005, Chávez had ceased relations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the State Department feared Chávez had ties to the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) based on ideological similarities and 
the ease enjoyed by the FARC and other leftist guerrilla groups in crossing the Colombia-
Venezuela border. Regarding a long-time U.S. adversary, Chávez strengthened ties to 
Cuba by increasing preferential oil supplies in exchange for Cuban health care workers. 
Economically, he had pushed to weaken U.S. influence in the region by creating the 
Bolivian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an alternative option to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). He had also created PetroCaribe, a preferential oil 
program for the Caribbean.92  Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution and anti-United States 
tactics were in full force.   
C. BUSH AND CHÁVEZ  
How did the United States respond to Chávez?  It primarily stuck to the same 
method of denouncing Chávez’s actions without taking any economic measures that 
would disrupt oil imports. One of the first areas the United States spoke out about was the 
undemocratic actions by the Chávez regime in arresting four leaders of the civic group 
Súmate. Founded in 2002, Súmate is a group dedicated to the promotion of democracy 
and the rights of Venezuelans to participate in the political process. They specifically 
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play an important role in establishing transparency and protecting human rights.93  
Arrested for receiving U.S. assistance to encourage participation in the 2004 referendum, 
one of the leaders was María Corina Machado. Machado had become a key anti-Chávez 
ally of the United States and had personally met with President Bush in 2005. Machado 
herself faced up to 16 years in prison, and Súmate claimed that there were 200 other 
political prisoners facing a similar situation.94  On November 17, 2005, the 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House International Relations 
Committee held a hearing on democracy in Venezuela at which an executive committee 
member of Súmate spoke and highlighted the human rights violations occurring in 
Venezuela, such as the unlawful detention of the group’s leaders as well as baseless 
arrests of members of the political opposition.95  The United States did not take any 
action against the government of Venezuela as a result of the testimony. Along the same 
lines, both State Department officials and then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
expressed concern over Venezuela’s pursuit of weapons. Regarding the break in 
cooperation with the DEA, the United States denied allegations that the administration 
was spying on Venezuela and expressed a desire to improve the relationship between the 
two states. Although not a government representative, U.S. television evangelist Pat 
Robertson exacerbated matters by declaring on television that the United States should 
assassinate Chávez. The message served as evidence to Chávez that the United States was 
meddling in Venezuelan affairs and prompted a formal response from State Department 
officials. Thomas Shannon, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, testified to Congress in the same subcommittee hearing on November 17 that 
democracy in Venezuela was in danger. Chávez escalated matters by responding that 
Bush was a “crazy, genocidal killer.”  Following the December National Assembly 
elections, the United States chose to wait for official responses from the OAS and 
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European Union (EU) observers before making a formal statement, but expressed 
concern at the voter abstention rate of 75 percent.96 
Halfway through the year, the United States recognized a downturn in the 
relationship as evidenced by the ongoing verbal attacks between the two countries. In 
response, the United States underwent a major reassessment of policy toward Venezuela. 
What had up to that point mostly been a policy of bilateral negotiations and use of the 
OAS became a new policy of supporting civil-society organizations in Venezuela and 
engaging other countries in an attempt to disperse some of Chávez’s influence in the 
region. By continuing to support groups such as Súmate and other non-profit 
organizations opposed to Chávez, U.S. officials hoped to avoid further public spats with 
the Venezuelan president. The new strategy was met with caution as some members of 
the Bush administration feared the actions could instead worsen the relationship. Other 
recommendations that emerged out of the multiagency task force responsible for 
reassessing U.S. policy toward Venezuela included working with Chávez along areas of 
mutual concern such as drug trafficking, ceasing funding of partisan groups or groups 
that partook in the 2002 coup, and a longer-term approach of addressing the socio-
economic situations that led to Chávez’s rise, such as unemployment and crime, in both 
Venezuela and other Latin American countries.97   
D. BALANCING A DELICATE RELATIONSHIP (2005-2006) 
Regardless of diplomatic actions by the United States, economically, U.S.-
Venezuela relations continued to be strong. Through the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), the United States increased funding democratic projects in Venezuela 
from $874,000 in FY2004, to $902,000 in FY2005, and up to $2 million in FY2006. A 
similar raise occurred in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for democratic projects, 
jumping from $496,000 in FY2005 to $500,000 in FY2006. The ARI, now known as the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), continued to provide funding, but as the efforts 
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between Venezuela and the DEA weakened, so too did financial support from the United 
States. Although not an area that was directly funded by the U.S. government, oil 
continued to be the main justification for improving the relationship between the two 
states, especially as concerns arose that Venezuela was seeking China as a replacement 
market for the United States.98    
The United States did take actions against Venezuela, specifically for the latter’s 
actions in the counter-narcotics effort and pursuit of foreign arms. On September 15, 
2005, President Bush designated Venezuela as “a country that has failed demonstrably to 
adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements.”99  The declaration, 
part of an annually required certification under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
is primarily used to enforce economic sanctions upon states that are not fulfilling their 
required duties as defined by the act.100  
The United States also refused to extradite three alleged Venezuelan terrorists. 
The first two, requested for extradition by Chávez in 2004, were Venezuelan National 
Guard lieutenants that allegedly bombed the Spanish Embassy and Colombian Consulate 
in Caracas. The two were detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and in February 2005 were denied asylum. Nevertheless, the United States chose 
not to extradite. The third individual, an anti-Castro activist, allegedly bombed a Cuban 
airliner in 1976, killing 73 people. The individual had been arrested in Venezuela but 
escaped in 1985 and illegally entered the United States from Mexico in April 2005. ICE 
detained the man on May 17, 2005, but chose to charge him with illegal entry into the 
United States, refusing to deport him to Venezuela for the stated reason that he may be 
tortured.101  Whether or not the United States was intentionally holding the three 
prisoners to spite Venezuela, the cases gave Chávez yet another conspiracy theory to 
increase his popular support and inadvertently created yet another talking point for 
Chávez regarding U.S. imperialism in the region.   
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If 2005 was a tumultuous year for United States-Venezuela affairs, the beginning 
of 2006 did little to make things better. On January 13, the State Department announced 
it had denied licenses of a technology transfer in a Spanish deal to sell planes to 
Venezuela. Although Spain went ahead with the deal by using non-U.S. technology, 
Chávez viewed the move as an effort by the United States to weaken Latin America.102  
Less than a month later, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made his remarks likening 
Chávez to Hitler (see above).103  In May, the United States went one step further 
regarding technology transfer and, according to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control 
Act, prohibited the sale or license of weapons and services to Venezuela. This move was 
a response to weakening antiterrorism efforts within Venezuela, listing it alongside other 
countries that had been sanctioned under Section 40A, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, 
and Syria. Although the move shows dismay with the Venezuelan government, multiple 
CRS reports clarify that it does not list Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism under 
the Export Administration Act.   
After years of condemning U.S. economic influence in Latin America, 
particularly as it relates to the FTAA, Venezuela formally joined the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) on July 4, 2006. The FTAA had been a topic of disagreement 
amongst the United States and Latin America since its proposal in 1994, but with 
Venezuela now a voting member of MERCOSUR, FTAA negotiations essentially came 
to a halt.104   
Threats by Chávez to disrupt the oil flow to the United States created other 
problems. In 2006, Venezuela still provided roughly 12 percent of all U.S. crude oil 
imports and by March, state-owned PdVSA had majority control of 25 of the 32 oil 
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operating agreements within Venezuela.105  Even with 68 percent of its oil exports going 
to the United States, Chávez warned that his government would “blow up its oil fields if 
the United States ever were to attack.”106  Although many saw Chávez’s growing threats 
as nothing more than rhetoric, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard 
Lugar requested a report on potential oil supply disruption, which was subsequently 
published by the Government Accountability Office in June 2006. The report concluded 
that not only would Venezuelan oil disruption decrease U.S. gross domestic product by 
$23 billion, it would raise world prices to $11 per barrel. The report also concluded, 
however, that the action would drive Venezuela into economic chaos and was unlikely to 
happen.107     
Events during the summer and fall of 2006 were equally detrimental to U.S.-
Venezuela relations. On August 18, the United States announced the new position of 
Mission Manager for Cuba and Venezuela. The job would entail collating information on 
the two countries across all intelligence agencies. In one of his most memorable 
moments, Chávez referred to Bush as the devil in front of the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly on September 20. The remarks were not taken well by members of the 
U.S. government, but they may have been even more hurtful for Chávez. In November, 
Chávez lost a months-long battle for a two-year seat on the UN Security Council. The 
seat was to be given to either Venezuela or Guatemala, but a two-thirds vote could not be 
achieved. In the end, Panama became the compromise candidate and took the seat. Some 
officials believe that Venezuela’s loss of the seat can partly be attributed to Chávez’s 
remarks in front of the UN General Assembly in September.108   
By the end of 2006, the U.S. 109th Congress had approved two resolutions 
against Venezuela. The first, Honorable Congress Resolution 400 (Burton) went through 
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on July 26 and criticized Venezuela’s counternarcotics actions, specifically its disregard 
for international airport certifications designed to inhibit illegal trafficking. The second, 
Senate Resolution 607 (Bunning), condemned Chávez’s September speech to the General 
Assembly and his undemocratic actions such as consolidating power domestically and 
destabilizing other countries in Latin America.   
Come November, the Council on Foreign Relations proposed yet another strategy 
for conducting business with Chávez. This time, the report argued, the United States 
should ignore Chávez’s often over-the-top rhetoric and should instead focus on bilateral 
and regional concerns such as energy security and terrorism. In the long-term, the report 
once again recommended addressing underlying socio-economic issues that led to 
Chávez’s election in the first place, such as inequality and poverty.109  In the final major 
event of the year, Chávez won reelection on December 3 with 63 percent of the popular 
vote, to 37 percent won by the opposition candidate, Manuel Rosales. Although there 
were rumors of misuse of state assets to promote Chávez’s campaign, the election was 
largely considered legitimate. Both the OAS and the EU monitored the election and 
stated that it was held legally and in a satisfactory manner. Even the United States 
respected the election and declared that it was positive to see a clear winner and that the 
opposition accepted the results.110     
E. EMERGING THREATS (2007-2008) 
Early into 2007, the United States became more and more focused on two topics 
in Venezuela: threats to democracy and the country’s military buildup. The first major 
threat to democracy issue was Chávez’s decision not to renew the expiring contract for 
Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), Venezuela’s oldest television station. The action was 
important enough to call the attention of the OAS, and on January 5, 2007, OAS 
Secretary General José Miguel Insulza stated that the action gave the appearance of 
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government censorship. RCTV had in fact often presented material critical of Chávez, but 
regardless of censorship allegations, the Venezuelan administration went through with 
the action. Additionally, the National Assembly voted on January 31 to give Chávez 
power for 18 months to enact presidential decrees. U.S. representatives feared that the 
new powers were leaning toward authoritarianism and detracted from democratic 
processes.111   
Chávez also continued to pursue weapons procurement from Russia, having 
secured contracts for 24 Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets, 50 military helicopters, 100,000 
Kalashnikov assault rifles, a license for a Kalashnikov factory in Venezuela, and 
potentially two or three submarines. The amount of weapons coming into Venezuela 
created multiple concerns for the United States. First, there were still concerns about 
Chávez’s ties to the FARC and that the incoming weapons would be used against 
Colombia. Second, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, believed 
that the influx of weapons could potentially lead to a regional arms race. Finally, 
Venezuela was strengthening its ties to Iran. Although the evidence at the time only 
signaled economic ties, such as a $2 billion investment fund agreed to between Chávez 
and then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there was also fear that the 
relationship could provide access to terrorists through lax border security and customs 
inspections.112       
Venezuela continued its undemocratic actions, often at the expense of the United 
States. On May 1, 2007, Chávez forced out two significant U.S. oil companies that had 
been working on Orinoco River Basin projects. The two companies, Phillips and Exxon 
Mobil, were negotiating a price of $5 billion for the being forced out, but the projects 
were taken over by PdVSA without any compensation.113   
Toward the year’s end, a controversial reform to the constitution came to a vote. 
On December 2, 2007, Venezuelans ultimately voted against 69 constitutional 
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amendments, although the margin of victory was very small. For more specifics on the 
constitutional amendments, refer to Chapter II. Many opposition leaders, including 
former presidential candidate Manuel Rosales, referred to the reforms as a constitutional 
coup.114  Bush responded to the vote by commending the Venezuelan people for 
promoting democracy and rejecting one-man rule.115  
In 2008, Chávez focused his efforts toward his neighbors in a year that was 
marked by a constant back and forth between the Venezuelan president and Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe. For the United States, this created yet another foreign policy 
dilemma as Uribe had established himself as a key ally to both the government and 
military thanks to the ARI and Plan Colombia. In January and February 2008, Chávez 
personally negotiated the release of multiple Colombian and Venezuelan hostages from 
the FARC. On March 1, 2008, the United States and Colombia celebrated a Colombian 
raid of a FARC camp in Ecuador that killed the FARCs second in command. Venezuela, 
upset by the unauthorized act by Colombia within a sovereign state, immediately cut ties 
with Uribe. Although the United States found no hard evidence to support the claims, 
computers seized in the raid allegedly linked Chávez to the FARC and said that the 
Venezuelan government had given more than $300 million to the terrorist group. Within 
the U.S. government, the alleged ties served as yet another basis for distrust toward 
Chávez. In response to a perceived threat from Colombia, Chávez mobilized troops at the 
Colombia-Venezuela border, but U.S. officials saw the event as an empty threat due to 
the small size of the Venezuelan military. Just days later, Chávez led negotiation talks at 
a Rio Group summit and was praised by the OAS Secretary General for deescalating 
tensions by peacefully negotiating a resolution with Uribe. On June 8, Chávez once again 
surprised the United States by calling for the unconditional release of all FARC hostages 
and that the FARC lay down their weapons. As had come to be expected from Chávez’s 
Venezuela, however, two senior Venezuelan intelligence officials and the former interior 
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minister were linked to the FARC, and the U.S. Treasury subsequently froze their assets 
on September 12, 2008.116     
Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia were not the only trouble area for the 
U.S.-Venezuelan relations in 2008. After an improvement in relations in the summer and 
fall, Chávez expelled the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, Patrick Duddy, in September 
2008, alleging the U.S. was conspiring to assassinate the Venezuelan president. In 
response, the United States expelled the Venezuelan ambassador, Bernardo Alvarez. 
Venezuela also continued to arm, receiving a $1 billion loan from Russia in September 
for weapons. Diplomatic ties to Iran grew as well, and by this time Hezbollah was 
officially connected to Venezuela through financing. In response, the U.S. Treasury froze 
the assets of two Venezuelans on June 18 for financially supporting the terrorist group.117   
Although Chávez’s foreign policy seemed to be working in his favor, his party 
strength domestically began to show weakness. Having consolidated all of his supporting 
parties into the singular United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Chávez and his 
supporters nonetheless seemed to be losing steam in the weeks up to the November state 
and local elections. By some accounts, his popularity rating had dropped as low as 34 
percent. Surprisingly, the PSUV won 17 of the 22 governor positions and more than 80 
percent of the mayoral races. Domestic and international groups criticized the 
government’s lack of transparency, particularly the fact that 272 individuals from the 
opposition had been disqualified from running because an alleged misuse of government 
funds. Even when it seemed Chávez was at his weakest, the PSUV was still able to 
ensure whole-of-government power in the executive, National Assembly, and state and 
municipal offices.118      
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F. U.S.-VENEZUELA RELATIONS UNDER THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION (2009) 
With a new president in Barack Obama, there was some hope that the United 
States-Venezuela relationship would get a fresh start, and to an extent, it did. Even with 
Obama already criticizing Chávez, a week before he had been inaugurated, Chávez 
remained hopeful that the United States could have a good relationship with Venezuela, 
as long as Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had the right attitude.119  To set 
the tone, Chávez presented Obama with a gift at their first meeting in April 2009 at the 
Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. The gift was a copy of Eduardo 
Galeano’s Latin American classic, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the 
Pillage of a Continent, a scathing take on how developed countries have taken advantage 
of Latin America throughout history.120  By June, the relationship had improved enough 
for the two states to return their respective ambassadors.   
Despite the promise of stronger relations, the U.S. government grew concerned 
about Chávez’s continued actions to centralize his power. On February 15, and with a 70 
percent voter turnout, the two-term limit for presidency was revoked, meaning Chávez 
could run again for office in 2012. Chávez’s campaign, based on the idea that he only 
wanted to serve until his Bolivarian project was complete in 2019, was once again largely 
funded by the state. Shortly thereafter, he moved to take power back from elected 
opposition officials, using the Navy to seize significant ports and imprisoning officials 
for corruption. Having already secured RCTV, the government also began to pressure the 
owner of Globovision, another channel that expressed views contradictory to Chávez’s. 
In July 2009, he began administrative proceedings to revoke the license of more than a 
third of the radio stations in Venezuela.121  The moves represented a significant attempt 
to consolidate power and silence opposition. In response, U.S. officials denounced 
Chávez. During her confirmation hearing to become the Secretary of State, Hillary 
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Clinton declared that Chávez was a “democratically elected leader who does not govern 
democratically.”  Obama echoed the sentiment, stating just a week before his 
inauguration in 2009 that Chávez “has been a force that has impeded progress in the 
region.”122 
The United States became further alarmed due to newly uncovered evidence that 
Chávez had ties to the FARC. On July 20, 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office published a report regarding Venezuela’s counternarcotics efforts. The report 
found widespread corruption in Venezuelan government officials, ties to illegally armed 
groups in Colombia, and a lack of a desire to cooperate with the United States. Finally, 
the report concluded that Venezuela significantly hurts the United States’ ability to 
interfere with illegal drug trafficking by allowing drugs to feely flow along its border 
with Colombia and into the Caribbean.123  President Obama himself stated that 
Venezuela was “exporting terrorist activities” and “supporting malicious entities like the 
FARC.”124 
Showing the FARC concerns were not just those of Colombia and the United 
States, Sweden confronted Venezuela on July 27, 2009, regarding three Swedish anti-
tank rocket launchers that were purchased by Venezuela in the 1980s and recovered from 
a FARC arms cache in October 2008. The Venezuelan government denied its role in the 
exchange, but it could not deny that government-purchased weapons had in fact ended up 
in the hands of the FARC. The transfer of Venezuelan weapons to the FARC created 
concern for the United States, as Venezuela had spent more than $5.3 billion in arms 
purchases since 2005. DNI Michael McConnell determined in 2008 that such a large 
amount, estimated to be more than three to four times as much as what would be needed 
for external defense, was not a significant threat because of logistical and maintenance 
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issues within Venezuela, but unusable weapons could easily be sold to groups like the 
FARC.125        
G. VENEZUELA’S TIES TO IRAN (2009–2010) 
As Venezuelan ties to the FARC began to emerge, so too did ties to an even 
greater threat for the United States: Iran and Hezbollah. The second half of 2009 was 
characterized by deepening ties between Venezuela and its Middle Eastern partner Iran. 
In April 2009, during one of his trips to Iran, Chávez and Ahmadinejad inaugurated a 
$200 million mutual development bank. Commercial flights between the two states flew 
on a weekly basis and were subject to only cursory immigration and customs controls. By 
September, Venezuela and Iran had signed three energy memorandums of understanding, 
with the most important aspect being a guarantee of gasoline exports from Venezuela to 
Iran in the event of UN or U.S. sanctions. Any funds received out of that particular 
situation would be deposited into Iranian machinery and technology purchases for 
Venezuela. This particular agreement will become pertinent a year later. With many UN 
countries criticizing Iran’s nuclear program, Chávez openly supported their desire for 
peaceful nuclear energy. Although there were no indicators of nuclear technology transfer 
between the two states, the United States remained concerned about the potentially 
dangerous development. In response to the new information, the House Subcommittee on 
the Western Hemisphere held a hearing titled “Iran in the Western Hemisphere.”126   
Representing the significance of Venezuela’s ties to Iran, the U.S. Treasury imposed 
multiple sanctions on Iranian individuals and banks within Venezuela.127 
At the start of 2010, the Obama administration’s hopes for mutual respect in 
Venezuela were dwindling. Perhaps DNI Dennis Blair best communicated U.S. concerns 
in his speech to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 2 of that year: 
“Chávez and his allies are likely to oppose nearly every U.S. policy initiative in the 
region, including the expansion of free trade, counter drug and counterterrorism 
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cooperation, military training, and security initiatives, and even U.S. assistance 
programs.”128  The year was mired by decreasing cooperation from the Venezuelan 
government, constant feuding between Venezuela and Colombia, and increasing ties 
between Iran and Venezuela.   
Perhaps the most significant action taken by the United States, although not 
directly related to Venezuela, was the July 1, 2010, approved sanctioning of Iran under 
P.L. 111–195, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
1010. Although there were initial questions as to whether or not Venezuela would be able 
to supply gasoline to Iran, based on its past inability to supply sufficient domestic 
quantities, there were multiple gasoline shipments between the two countries in 2010. In 
2010, the U.S. government was still attempting to determine if the shipments were 
violating the sanctions. Regardless, Chávez was staying loyal to his ally in Iran, even in 
the face of U.S. sanctions. Reports also surfaced in April 2010 that Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force was increasing its presence in Latin America, 
specifically in Venezuela, although the commander of USSOUTHCOM later dispelled 
these claims.129  The alleged ties to Iran, even if unfounded, remained a significant 
talking point for members of Congress.   
H. OPPOSITION GROWS AND CHÁVEZ WEAKENS (2010-2011)  
In 2010, one of Chávez’s staunchest regional critics, President Uribe, was on his 
way out, creating an opportunity for Chávez to decrease some of the U.S. regional 
influence it had through Colombia. In one of his outgoing speeches as president, Uribe 
made it clear that he believed Venezuela was still harboring FARC guerrillas. Venezuela 
responded by suspending diplomatic ties with its neighbor on July 22. New Colombian 
President Juan Manuel Santos renewed the relationship on August 10 and convinced 
Chávez to attempt to increase trade. A few months later, on November 2, 2010, the two 
states signed multiple economic and social agreements, as well as a shared border area. 
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The new relationship seemed to be improving and the United States noted a reduction in 
Venezuelan support for the FARC as border security improved, more arrests were made, 
and more drugs were confiscated.130   
Chávez may have been adopting a new strategy with Colombia, but his credibility 
back home was slipping. With one of the highest crime rates in the world and a now 
contracting economy, Chávez faced a true political challenge in the September 26 
National Assembly election. Although the PSUV still won 98 of the 165 seats, it was 
widely seen as a loss for Chávez. The opposition, now united under the coalition 
Democratic Unity Platform (MUD), won enough seats to keep Chávez from having the 
three-fifths and two-thirds majorities in the National Assembly to push through a wide 
array of new laws. No external election monitoring groups were allowed in, but 30 
witnesses from abroad did declare the elections fair.131   
Unfortunately for the MUD, the outgoing National Assembly pushed through 
several laws in December 2010, including 18 months of decree power for Chávez. 
Washington heavily opposed the move, with both the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs and the left-leaning Washington Office on Latin America 
declaring the actions an assault on popular will. The new laws also placed restrictions on 
Internet traffic similar to those already in place on television and radio. Implicating U.S. 
efforts that have aided the opposition, Chávez also passed the Law of the Defense of 
Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination, limiting foreign assistance to civil 
society groups in Venezuela.132  Chávez’s heavy handed response to the legislative 
elections helped secure his place as relevant in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America for 
at least two more years, until the scheduled 2012 presidential election. 
The year 2011 was relatively quiet in terms of actions between the Venezuela and 
the United States. For Venezuela, the economy continued to drop while inflation rose. 
Even with a now 211 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, up from the previous 99 
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billion thanks to the inclusion of heavy Orinoco Belt oil, Chávez was forced to modify 
their exchange rate for the second time in as many years, overvaluating the Bolivar 
Fuerte. Economic problems were accompanied by consistent blackouts across the 
country and rationing for shortages of public goods like food and water. Regarding 
Venezuelan natural resources, the United States determined on May 24, 2011, that 
PdVSA had violated the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010 by providing two shipments of reformate to Iran.133  As a result, PdVSA was 
“prohibited from competing for U.S. government procurement contracts, securing 
financing from the Export-Import Bank, and obtaining U.S. export licenses.”134  Of 
particular note, the sanctions specifically left out Citgo, a subsidiary of PdVSA and major 
supplier of oil to the United States, and any language limiting the export of oil to the 
United States. Considering 51 percent of Venezuela’s exports go to the United States, the 
sanctions were mostly viewed as a weak warning.135  
I. CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF U.S.-VENEZUELA RELATIONS 
(2011–2012) 
Although President Obama had expressed some interest in renewing Venezuelan 
relations at the beginning of his first campaign, his second campaign saw a return to a 
similar policy approach to the one used by Bush. Rather than engaging Chávez in 
rhetorical spats in the media, Obama opted for a policy of avoiding direct arguments with 
Chávez while still speaking out about Venezuela’s links to undemocratic actions, drug 
trafficking, and terrorism. Adding to U.S. frustrations, Chávez appointed General Henry 
Rangel Silva as his defense minister in 2012. Silva not only had a long history working 
with Chávez, he was also under U.S. sanctions for ties with the FARC that dated back to 
2008.136  The United States was also forced to respond when the Venezuelan Consul 
General in Miami was caught on a Mexican documentary attempting to recruit Mexican 
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students for cyber attacks against the United States. The Department of State declared her 
as persona non grata on January 8, but her alleged ties to Iran reinforced U.S. beliefs that 
Iran was still a negative presence in the region.137   
Around the same time, Chávez was returning to his presidential duties following a 
bout with cancer for which he had been treated several times in late 2011. Providing a 
nine-hour address to the National Assembly on January 13, he attempted to show he was 
back to full strength, only to be sidelined again weeks later when the cancer returned. An 
old wrongdoing resurfaced for Chávez when ExxonMobil won a suit at the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for $900 million in 
reimbursements for when Chávez seized and nationalized its assets. Rather than make the 
payment, which was significantly lower than ExxonMobil had demanded when the case 
began, Chávez announced he would withdraw from the ICSID and would not recognize 
the decision.138   
After two years of economic decline, 2011 and 2012 saw growth. This proved 
convenient as it allowed Chávez to return to government spending on social programs as 
part of his reelection campaign. One plan in particular provided nearly 200,000 housing 
units for those without a place to live. An August 25 explosion at an oil refinery killed 
more than 40 people and raised concerns about PdVSA’s maintenance and management 
ability, but the Chávez regime was able to pass it off as an unpreventable accident.   
Denying any human rights abuses within his border, Chávez continued to deny 
representatives of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights access to his 
borders, a practice he had been conducting for nearly a decade, but he went one step 
farther in July 2012 by declaring Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights.139  Also in July, the U.S. Treasury enforced sanctions on three more 
Venezuelans with alleged ties to Hezbollah. Recognizing the ties while not placing too 
much significance to them, Obama stated in a press interview in July that Chavez’s 
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actions with Iran the past several years had not created any significant national security 
concern for the United States.140  By fall, however, attention shifted from ties to Iran and 
human rights violations and focused solely on the October presidential election. On 
October 7, 80.7 percent of the voters showed up and reelected Chávez with 55 percent of 
the vote over MUD’s candidate Henrique Capriles. In a relatively surprising move, the 
White House praised the 6 million voters for their peaceful participation and said that 
their voices would be respected in the future relationship between the United States and 
Venezuela. Two months later, the PSUV won 20 of the 23 state elections and it seemed 
Chavismo was back on the rise until Chávez’s health took a turn for the worse in 
December.141   
J. CHÁVEZ’S FALL AND MADURO’S PRESIDENCY (2012–PRESENT) 
By late 2012, Chávez’s health had worsened and he had handpicked newly 
appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his replacement. On March 5, 2013, Chávez 
ultimately lost his battle with cancer and passed away. Recognizing the coming change, 
the United States began to back away from its standard criticism of Venezuela. Following 
Chávez’s death, Obama opted for a statement supporting the people of Venezuela and an 
opportunity to improve bilateral relations, completely avoiding the traditional 
condolences for loss of a head of state. Meanwhile, Maduro took the oath of office on 
March 8 and a new presidential election was scheduled for April 14, pitting Maduro 
against former MUD candidate Henrique Capriles. Riding the wave of support for 
Chávez and his by-name replacement recommendation, Maduro continued to use state 
resources for his campaign and defeated Capriles by a 1.49 percent margin. International 
election monitoring groups were barred from the event, but the Carter Center and 
domestic observers were highly critical of the legality of the campaign process and the 
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election itself. The opposition filed two challenges to the Supreme Court over the ruling, 
but on August 7, both were dismissed and criticized for insulting to the court.142 
With new, significant changes in the political arena and recognizing a potential 
opportunity to improve relations, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan 
Vice President Elías Jaua in June 2013 at an OAS General Assembly meeting. Both 
agreed to continue open dialogue in an effort to improve relations, but engagement 
became problematic a month later when Maduro openly offered asylum to U.S. classified 
information leaker Edward Snowden. Soon thereafter, Venezuela announced it was 
ceasing any effort to improve relations with the United States after Obama’s nominee for 
UN Ambassador, Samantha Power, stated that Maduro was engaging in a crackdown on 
civil society.143   
By March 2013, Maduro made his first foray into the expelling of diplomats game 
that Chávez had grown accustomed to. It began with Maduro expelling two U.S. military 
attachés, a move that was returned by the United States with the expulsion of two 
Venezuelan diplomats. In September, Maduro expelled three more U.S. diplomats for 
allegedly attempting to destabilize Venezuela. The United States responded in kind, 
expelling three Venezuelan diplomats in October, including Calixto Ortega, who was 
reportedly being considered for the position of Ambassador to the United States. Kerry 
opened up to Venezuela again in December following the municipal elections, expressing 
disappointment in the way the relationship had fallen apart but hope that it could get 
better. Throughout the year, the United States continued with three annual declarations 
that by then were common in denouncing actions by Venezuela. The first was the State 
Department’s human rights report for Venezuela. For more than a decade, the report had 
accused Venezuela of consolidating control in the executive and censoring free press. 
The 2013 report made specific note of Venezuela’s official withdrawal from the Inter-
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American Court of Human Rights on September 10, 2013, and the alleged 21 political 
prisoners in Venezuelan jails.144   
The second annual declaration was Obama’s determination under the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act that Venezuela was not adhering to its anti-drug obligations, 
the ninth consecutive year the U.S. president had determined as much. Although Maduro 
was not as strongly suspected of ties to the FARC as Chávez had been, there were still 
many important officials in the regime believed to be working with the terrorist group. 
The third report, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of March 2013, 
stated that Venezuela remained an important route of drug traffickers, with the supply 
often ending up in the Eastern Caribbean, Central America, the United States, Western 
Africa, or Europe. Finally, in May 2013 Venezuela was once again determined to be 
uncooperative with the United States in its antiterrorism efforts for the seventh 
consecutive year. The determination ensured that arms exports from the United States to 
Venezuela would remain illegal.145 
In early 2014, social unrest resulting from violence and economic problems, 
among other topics, reached a breaking point and violent protests emerged around the 
country. Both the OAS and the Obama administration called for peaceful negotiations 
between Maduro and the opposition. Panama in particular asked for a special meeting of 
the OAS on February 27, leading to Maduro’s suspension of diplomatic ties with Panama 
on March 5. The OAS finally met on March 7, but much to the dismay of the United 
States, the subsequent resolution highlighted the principle of non-intervention and 
supported Maduro. Only the United States, Panama, and Canada opposed the resolution. 
Just over two weeks later on March 21, Panama once again raised the issue at the OAS, 
this time having made Venezuelan National Assembly member Maria Corina Machado a 
special member of its delegation. The OAS rejected Panama’s request and Machado was 
stripped of her National Assembly position for her actions. The Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), a regional organization along the lines of the OAS, also met on 
March 12 and approved a resolution supporting Maduro. By April, UNASUR had begun 
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to lead negotiations between Maduro and the opposition, using the church as an 
intermediary. The United States recognized its inability to negotiate with Maduro 
bilaterally and instead opted for a strategy of supporting the UNASUR-led negotiations. 
Nevertheless, Kerry and Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson Roberta Jacobson claimed 
sanctions were still a valid option. Congress responded also, both in the House and in the 
Senate, by approving resolutions that supported the people of Venezuela. The Senate 
resolution in particular, Senate Resolution 365 of March 12, called for the President to 
impose sanctions.146   
K. CONCLUSION 
Having provided a detailed description of events between 2000 and 2014, the 
problem then becomes identifying a consistent U.S. policy throughout. The running 
theme throughout the decade has been one of maintaining access to Venezuela’s natural 
resources. Even after nearly 15 years of a tumultuous relationship, Venezuela remains the 
fourth-largest exporter of crude oil to the United States.147  The lengths the United States 
would go to achieve these ends were present in the sanctioning of Venezuela for its 
exports to Iran. Not only did the United States exclude its own subsidiary of PdVSA 
Citgo, it also excluded all forms of export from Venezuela to the United States. Second to 
access to natural resources, the United States also attempted to promote counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, and human rights throughout. The consistency of these secondary 
missions can be found throughout the U.S. government. Even General Bantz Craddock, 
Commander of USSOUTHCOM stated in 2005 that the United States needed a “broad 
based interagency approach to dealing with Venezuela in order to encourage functioning 
democratic institutions.”148  Almost each time the United States publicly spoke out 
against actions by Chávez or Maduro, the comments targeted terrorism, drugs, or human 
rights. These public outcries were often accompanied by economic changes, either by 
taking away funds for combatting terrorism and drugs or increasing funds to support 
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groups like Súmate. At times, policy shifted between negotiating bilaterally and using 
international organizations. In recent years, however, Venezuela seemed to opt more 
toward using either UNASUR or the OAS, recognizing its decisions carried more weight 
when backed up by other countries. Making any policy option difficult was Chávez, U.S. 
officials stressed on multiple occasions how it seemed impossible to do right in the eyes 
of Venezuelans, and this was largely part of Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and its anti-
imperialism mission. Maduro has continued to do the same early on in his term as 
President, but it is hard to match the popular support and charisma of Chávez. For now, it 
appears the United States is content in occasionally denouncing actions by Maduro, as 
long as a legitimate threat to his natural resources does not arise.  
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IV. DIPLOMACY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ evolving relationship to and role in the Organization of 
American States (OAS) is one indicator of decreased U.S. influence in Latin America. 
This decrease can be linked, in part, to U.S. policies toward Venezuela. In Latin America, 
the OAS has served as one of the key conflict management institutions in the western 
hemisphere for more than 60 years. As U.S.-Venezuela relations began to sour in the 
2000s, the OAS may have seemed to be the most logical choice to work out the 
differences. In fact, both academics and policymakers for the United States and 
Venezuela made such a recommendation, and as this chapter will highlight, the countries 
obliged in certain instances. Rather than pursue points of mutual agreement within the 
OAS, the United States often found itself acting outside of the majority.   
To understand how the OAS has remained an important venue for U.S. 
engagement with Latin America, and yet also how the United States has, especially 
through its policies toward Venezuela, isolated itself to a certain extent from the OAS, 
this chapter will first provide a background on the creation, roles, and evolution of the 
OAS. These competing organizations therefore indicate further reduction in U.S. 
influence in the region, a reduction furthered by U.S.–Venezuela relations. As this thesis 
is concerned with United States and Venezuela relations, it will then pinpoint key crises 
between the two states and how the OAS reacted. The chapter concludes with the 
argument that the OAS is an organization that largely acts on consensus, a factor that now 
leaves the United States in the minority.    
B. INFLUENCING THE CREATION OF THE OAS 
Formally created on April 30, 1948, with the signing of the OAS Charter in 
Bogotá, Colombia, the OAS represented the culmination of a long history of international 
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cooperation within Latin America.149  For its part, however, the United States entered 
into the OAS with a fundamentally different perspective than its Latin American 
counterparts. In his article “International Cooperation in Latin America: the Design of 
Regional Institutions by Slow Accretion,” Jorge I. Domínguez points to honoring 
inherited boundaries, defending sovereignty and nonintervention, mediating disputes, and 
weak implementation of agreements as four historical tendencies within Latin America 
that were present during the creation of the OAS.150   
Domínguez traces the idea of regionalism within Latin America back to Simón 
Bolívar’s liberation of much of South America from Spain in the 1800s. By 1822 Bolívar 
had created Gran Colombia out of what is now known as Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Panama, and in 1826, he held a Spanish American international conference in 
Panama. The three-week gathering consisted of members from Gran Colombia, Mexico, 
Central America, and Peru and created multiple treaties designed to increase cooperation 
and regional security, among other topics. Bolívar’s dream of a unified Latin America 
fell apart only a few years later, but it serves as a moment in time to which the start of 
regional cooperation can be attributed.151   
For the next 100 years, the United States and Latin America embarked on 
different paths of development. Whereas the United States continued to expand its 
territory throughout the 1800s, Latin America settled upon a principle of uti possidetis 
juris, one that would come to be used around the globe as a legal right within 
international law. In this context, Latin American states accepted the boundaries 
emplaced by their former colonial powers, with future conflicts only concerning 
relatively small pieces of land and not large masses that would redefine the structure of 
the state. Without the threat of invasion from neighboring countries, Latin Americans 
began to develop their national identities without needing to address security concerns. 
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As Domínguez notes, only six border violations led to armed conflict in nearly 200 years 
of independence. While the United States engulfed more and more land in an effort to 
increase security, Latin American states found peaceful methods to accept their 
boundaries.152 
As interstate wars began to fade in the late 1800s, the question shifted to one of 
when to intervene in another state’s internal affairs. At the time, both the United States 
and European countries agreed that they had the right to protect their citizens, businesses, 
and Western interests regardless of where those individuals and entities may be located. 
Latin American countries, on the other hand, acted in accordance with the perspective of 
Argentine international jurist Carlos Calvo who believed that state sovereignty was an 
inviolable right, an idea that became known as the Calvo Doctrine. Argentine Foreign 
Minister Luis Drago furthered Calvo’s position in 1902 by arguing with the Drago 
Doctrine that the United States and other European states were unlawful in their efforts to 
collect foreign debt through armed intervention. Both matters were brought up in 
international environments, with the Calvo Doctrine taking issue at the First International 
Conference of American States in Washington, DC, in 1889, and the Drago Doctrine 
emerging at the Third Conference, this time in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1906. In both 
instances Latin American states favored doctrines that the United States opposed.153    
In addition to respecting both boundaries and state sovereignty, Latin Americans 
also developed a keen ability to resolve disputes through mediation. Beginning in the 
1880s, the ability to peacefully negotiate solutions can partially be attributed to the nearly 
40-year absence of interstate war in Latin America until the 1920s. As conflict in the 
region rose between 1925 and 1942, one could reasonably expect the amount of 
mediation to drop as states turned to arming instead of negotiating. Instead, mediation 
increased, even crossing subregion as South American states aided in Central American 
affairs and vice versa. Although the United States was involved in both disputes and 
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resolutions, the ability to peacefully mediate truly emerged as a distinct Latin American 
feature leading up to the creation of the OAS.154   
A final tendency within Latin American states prior to the establishment of the 
OAS was one of weak implementation. Domínguez once again ties this trait back to 
Bolívar and the Panama Congress in 1826. Although multiple accords and treaties were 
signed at the conference, Gran Colombia had disintegrated just three years later and few 
of the states had actually implemented the policies put forth in those agreements. Looking 
ahead nearly 100 years, the International Conference of American States in Santiago, 
Chile, in 1923 saw similar results. Under the leadership of Paraguay, the states 
represented signed the first inter-American treaty on international security where each 
signatory agreed not to use its military against another member. Six years later, an even 
more detailed agreement came out of a specialized conference in Washington, D.C., with 
the support of all OAS member states. Nevertheless, within 10 years, few of the countries 
had ratified the agreement, and Paraguay, the originating force behind security 
cooperation, had begun a violent war against Bolivia, demonstrating the non-binding 
nature of the international security treaty.155   
C. THE OAS EMERGES 
The United States had consistently expressed an interest in Latin America, even if 
the tendencies of the region differed from its own. Until the 1930s, the relationship from 
the U.S. perspective can most specifically be considered as part of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Established in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine intended for the United States to protect Latin 
American from states outside of the hemisphere, while exerting its own influence in the 
region. Serving as one of the main arguments for the likes of Calvo and Drago as forceful 
intervention in Latin American affairs, the United States ultimately transitioned to what 
would come to be known as President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, 
opting for a similar policy of non-intervention as the one Latin American states had been 
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using since their independence.156  As a sign of the positive turn in the relationship, the 
United States and Latin American countries signed the Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States in 1933, not only recognizing the equality of states, but also the principle 
of nonintervention. Although World War II took a large amount of the attention of the 
United States away from Latin America, there were significant moments of cooperation, 
leading to the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known 
as the Rio Treaty, in 1947. It was at this point, after more than 100 years of cooperation, 
that the region created its most powerful organization to date, with the signing of the 
OAS Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948. 
This event can be marked as the formal start of what is today known as the inter-
American system.157     
Making up the OAS are three main bodies: the General Assembly, Permanent 
Council, and General Secretariat. The General Assembly serves as the policy creation 
branch and meets annually. With representatives of all 34 member states, each holding a 
single and equal vote, the General Assembly makes decisions based on an absolute 
majority of affirmative votes. There are certain decisions such as the approval of the 
budget that require a two-thirds vote, but for the most part the decisions are based on a 
simple majority vote. The General Assembly can also meet outside of regularly 
scheduled sessions as a result of important international events, as will be seen later in 
this chapter. The Permanent Council is located in Washington and is often found 
regulating disputes between member states. With the OAS acceptance of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, the Council was also granted the power of enacting 
diplomatic initiatives in the event of unconstitutional changes of sovereign governments. 
Once again, each member state has a representative on the Council that holds a single 
vote. Rather than operating on a majority, the Council requires a two-thirds affirmative 
vote to pass resolutions. The final body of the OAS, the General Secretariat, acts as the 
enforcer. Headed by a Secretary General and an Assistant Secretary General that are each 
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elected for five-year terms, the General Secretariat must ensure implementation of 
General Assembly and Permanent Council resolutions.158  According to a report by the 
Inter-American Dialogue, it is the Secretary General who is most responsible for both 
success and failure within the OAS. In theory, a charismatic and driven Secretary General 
has the ability to push the General Assembly and the Permanent Council to similar ends 
so that the OAS expresses unified responses to crises.159    
Taking into account Latin American principles of non-intervention and peaceful 
resolution to conflict, as well as the post-World War II context in which the United States 
joined the OAS, it should be no surprise that collective regional security was a key 
objective of the group’s creation. In fact, Article I of the OAS Charter reads: “The 
American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have 
developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to 
strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, 
and their independence. Within the UN, the Organization of American States is a regional 
agency.”160  The opening Article plays into the desires of not only the Latin American 
states, but also the United States, which could benefit from stable, peaceful neighbors.   
Over time, the OAS began to develop a broader mission. In 1959, the OAS 
created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to comply with the provisions 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Shortly thereafter it 
branched out into efforts concerning economic, social, cultural, scientific, and even 
technological ends. A significant development occurred in response to violent human 
rights abuses by authoritarian regimes in the 1970s with the creation of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in 1978. As drug distribution increased, the OAS 
created the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission in 1986. Having 
experienced problems with insurgent groups such as the Shining Path in Peru and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the group also created the Inter-
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American Committee Against Terrorism in 1999. One of the more recent, and arguably 
most important, developments within the OAS was the creation and acceptance of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. As such, the OAS has become much more 
than an organization based on regional security. It now seeks to boost social and 
economic development, mediate disputes among member states, and decrease the class 
divide by eradicating poverty, among other goals. The OAS now claims that defending 
democracy is its most important role.161 
D. OAS AND DEMOCRACY 
The evolution of the OAS into a pro-democracy institution is an important one, 
specifically as it relates to the United States and its relations with Venezuela since 2000, 
since the OAS became more involved in defending democracy and the United States saw 
Chávez steering away from democratic principles. As such, it is valuable to provide 
background regarding some of the key steps in the transition. Although the United States 
has always had an important role in the OAS, the organization has not always been a 
promoter of democracy. For example, in 1962 the OAS suspended Cuba due to the 
latter’s communist government, but the organization also actively supported the 
authoritarian governments of places like Argentina and Chile.162  Some academics place 
the beginning of the shift toward supporting democracy at the end of the Cold War, but 
Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler believe change started even earlier. By the 1970s, 
much of Latin America was controlled by military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes, 
many of which committed gross human rights violations. One such country was 
Nicaragua, under the harsh patriarchal rule of the Somoza family for some 40 years. In 
1979, for the first time, the OAS passed a resolution that condemned the Somoza 
government and its record of human rights violations. Even though the majority of the 
OAS countries that voted experienced similar situations domestically, including 
Argentina and Chile, the resolution created two key precedents according to Cooper and 
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Legler: the OAS (1) was capable of and prepared to denounce non-democracies and (2) 
now had the ability to either legitimize or delegitimize governments across the region.163    
By 1985, the principle of developing democracy throughout the region continued 
to advance, this time with the signing of the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias. Amending 
Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the OAS Charter, the member states of the OAS now were 
obligated to promote representative democracy while still respecting the principle of 
nonintervention. Unfortunately, implementation proved problematic and in 1989 the 
leader of Panama, president Manuel Noriega, showed the intention of cancelling 
upcoming presidential elections. In response, the OAS passed Resolution 534, the right of 
the Panamanian people to elect their leaders democratically. This initiative never moved 
past the resolution, as OAS member states opted not to enforce sanctions or directly 
condemn Noriega.164  With the collapse of the Cold War and the events of Panama still in 
recent history, the OAS passed the Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the 
Inter-American System in Santiago in 1991. Packaged alongside the Commitment to 
Democracy was Resolution 1080 on representative democracy. The two changes in 
Santiago laid the institutional groundwork that would allow the OAS to not only use 
rhetoric to condemn states straying away from democracy, but also the ability to 
operationally affect states. Acting on its new authority, the OAS has used Resolution 
1080 in places like Haiti and Peru to enforce economic sanctions or to create OAS-led 
fact-finding missions.165  By the late 1990s, the OAS was a both a political and 
operational defender of democracy.   
The culmination of the OAS transition into a democratic enforcement institution 
was the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001. Not 
only was democracy now declared a right of all people of the Americas, but governments 
were now formally obligated to promote and defend democracy under the OAS. The 
passing of the new Charter brought legitimacy and forced acceptance for several 
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institutions that had been developing within the OAS for years. One such organization 
that had an effect on the global scale was the electoral observation mission of the OAS. 
Beginning in the 1960s as a relatively minimal offering by the OAS, electoral monitoring 
grew to a process that has been used more than 200 times in 27 countries throughout the 
region. Such efforts have been praised for their impartiality and have helped create 
similar processes in organizations such as the UN. On multiple occasions the OAS has 
also provided tools and technical assistance to states looking to strengthen their 
democracies. Recently, for example, the OAS has been involved in the Mission to 
Support the Peace Process in Colombia in an effort to an end to FARC violence. The 
previously mentioned Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights remain key components of supporting democracy in the region. 
Rather than being bogged down by the UN’s legal system or potentially receiving unfair 
trials domestically, cases can be both investigated and tried within the OAS. Human 
rights is not just a reactive issue for the OAS, as the organization constantly monitors and 
observes human rights within its member states. Finally, the OAS remains committed to 
regional security, even more so now as it has placed greater importance on stabilizing 
democracies. Cooperation in the fight against drugs and terrorism is common, and the 
region remains largely free of inter-state conflict.166  The OAS now serves as a catch-all 
institution for handling many matters, both domestic and international. 
E. CHALLENGING THE ORDER 
While this Chapter follows the United States’ role in and relation to the OAS, the 
broader role of the OAS in the region has shifted, too. Other, competing regional 
organizations have emerged. Therefore, to the extent that the United States has retained 
influence in the OAS, at a regional level, that influence has been diluted by the power of 
the other organizations. Historically the United States has played an important role in the 
OAS, both politically in setting examples for other states, and economically, providing a 
significant portion of the budget. The economic trend has continued into the present day, 
with the United States providing 41 percent of the total OAS budget in FY2013. The 
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United States also continues to provide an example for developing states in the region 
regarding democratic principles, providing economic and educational assistance.167  U.S. 
political and economic strength does not, however, directly translate to influence in the 
OAS. Carolyn M. Shaw challenged a commonly held belief that the OAS is a tool of U.S. 
influence in her article “Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American 
States.”  Using 30 cases of regional conflict management between 1948 and 2002, she 
determined that the OAS is more likely to operate in a consensus than to simply bow to 
U.S. pressure. She highlights four influential factors that play a role in determining how 
much influence the United States will have: amount of resources needed to carry out 
resolutions, level of disagreement among Latin American members, threats to regional 
stability, and unilateral actions by the United States or other member states. According to 
these hypotheses, the United States will hold more influence in the OAS as resources, 
threats, or disagreement increases. When Latin American states are acting in a consensus 
or if the United States has acted unilaterally and without the consent of the OAS, the 
United States is less likely to achieve favorable outcomes.168    
Even if the U.S. is not as influential within the OAS as one may think, other 
organizations have emerged nonetheless that challenge the OAS as a whole. One such 
organization is the Summit of the Americas, created in 1994 by an initiative of U.S. 
President Bill Clinton. The Summit of the Americas called for periodic meetings among 
all of the democratically elected heads of state within the region. The Summit was 
designed to cut through layers of bureaucracy within the OAS and to enact policies at a 
quicker pace. Created as a presidential initiative, the OAS was left out of the planning 
and organizing of the first Summit in Miami, and many leaders welcomed the chance to 
meet directly with fellow leaders. According to Robin L. Rosenberg, the eagerness to 
reinvigorate hemispheric cooperation at the presidential level blinded leaders from 
realizing that they were in essence creating a duplicate forum form multilateralism within 
the region. The first Summit was largely successful and out of it came a requirement for 
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the OAS to follow up on many of the mandates that were agreed to by Summit states. 
Recognizing the potential for the Summit of the Americas process to grow too powerful, 
the Secretary General of the OAS asked to play a more important role and ultimately 
created the OAS Committee on Summits Management. Now, in addition to its already 
existing roles, the OAS also helps plan, coordinate, and follow-up with member states to 
ensure compliance with Summit outcomes. Rather than completely absorbing the 
Summit, the OAS instead plays a pivotal role in its efficiency.169  Although the intention 
of the Summit was not to take away from the importance of the OAS, it inadvertently 
weakened the organization by both downplaying its efficiency and requiring it to create 
new bodies to account for the actions taken by the Summit.   
Perhaps the largest challengers to the OAS are the Bolivarian Alliance of the 
Americas (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Created in 
2004 by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, ALBA strives to promote regional 
integration, socioeconomic reform, and poverty alleviation. ALBA is important to this 
discussion because it opposes the United States and, for the most part, the OAS. 
Consisting of nine states, many of which are politically aligned to socialist or communist 
ideologies such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the group is based on the principles 
created by Simón Bolívar in the 1800s.170  Some academics and U.S. policymakers 
believe that ALBA is not a real threat to either the OAS or U.S. interests in Latin 
America, but that has not stopped the introduction of House Resolution 1687 from being 
introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives. The resolution, which is currently 
awaiting action by the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, would 
require the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS to reiterate the importance of 
Human Rights and for the U.S. President to impose sanctions against officials of ALBA 
associated with violating said human rights.171   
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UNASUR, on the other hand, has taken a less combative approach toward the 
OAS and the United States but still chooses to promote south-south relations that exclude 
North America. Consisting of 12 South American countries, UNASUR promotes 
political, economic, and security coordination throughout the continent. Whereas ALBA 
has not presented significant challenges to the authority and mission of the OAS, 
UNASUR has been called on in multiple instances to decrease tensions between two 
states and to serve as a mediator.172  Thanks largely to support from Brazil, UNASUR 
emerged in 2008 as an umbrella organization that unified the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations. Although the union was created 
around two economic organizations, UNASUR was created as a political solution and 
counter to the OAS.173  Once again, the creation of an organization that was exclusive to 
Latin American states was appealing and chipped away at the influence of the OAS in the 
region.   
Even when up against other organizations such as the Summit of the Americas, 
ALBA, or UNASUR, the OAS has remained relevant in the international order. In 2013, 
for example, the General Assembly adopted three declarations and 49 resolutions in its 
43rd session in Antigua, Guatemala. In what has become common since the establishment 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Declaration 71 stressed the 
importance of human rights education within its member states. The Declaration came as 
a result of nearly a decade of research and reports completed by the Inter-American 
Institute of Human Rights.174   
The OAS also found itself involved in disputes extending beyond the Americas. 
Declaration 72 encouraged Argentina to continue on its path toward peacefully 
negotiating a settlement of its dispute with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas 
Islands. Its third declaration that year, Declaration of Antigua Guatemala For a 
Comprehensive Policy Against the World Drug Problem in the Americas, set forth 
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multiple steps in which OAS members will come together to continue developing an 
effective solution toward stopping illegal drugs in the region. Of the 49 resolutions, 
topics varied from economic, security, policy, mediation, and many more.175  Regardless 
of efforts by alternative regional institutions, either advertently or inadvertently, to 
decrease the effectiveness of the OAS, the fact that declarations and resolutions continue 
to be made shows that member states still view it as a valid form of mediation in 
international affairs.   
F. THE UNITED STATES, VENEZUELA, AND THE OAS 
The previous two chapters have highlighted what has often been a tumultuous 
relationship between the United States and Venezuela since the beginning of the new 
millennium. Throughout the same time period, U.S. policymakers have rarely pursued 
proactive measures toward addressing Venezuelan affairs through the OAS, even though 
academics as recently as this year have made such a recommendation. In his testimony to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding Venezuela’s early 2014 political 
crisis, Venezuelan and Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace Moisés Naím made five recommendations for the United States to engage with 
Venezuela. Three of his five recommendations included using international organizations 
such as the OAS to confront Venezuela because of the negative effect experienced in the 
past of bilateral negotiations with either Chávez or current president Nicolás Maduro. 
Naím’s theory is that the United States must identify topics that would generally be 
accepted by consensus within the OAS but that would also be contradictory to current 
events in Venezuela. He believes that fact-finding institutions within the OAS could 
identify human rights violations, corruption, and other problems within Venezuela that 
would contradict the democratic principles of the OAS. Although it is easy for Maduro to 
deny the accusations when coming directly from the United States, it would be much 
more difficult to deny them when they come in the form of a consensus vote of the 
OAS.176      
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If the United States does choose to engage Venezuela through the OAS, are there 
any implications that it would actually work?  This chapter will now look at four events 
where relations between the United States and Venezuela were tense and how the OAS 
responded. Looking at events that occurred post-Cold War, the first significant tension 
within Venezuela were the two coup attempts that occurred in 1992. Having experienced 
40 years of democratic stability between two political parties, albeit rife with corruption, 
the armed forces, led by Chávez, attempted to overthrow the elected president Carlos 
Andrés Pérez. For the United States, instability in Venezuela meant instability for a 
region that was seeing a significant terrorist threat with groups such as the Shining Path 
in Peru. The coup attempt failed shortly after it began, but the OAS Permanent Council 
went ahead with a special session the same day to address the issue. No formal 
intervention occurred because President Pérez retained power, but the OAS did reiterate 
its right to take necessary action according to Resolution 1080 if something were to 
happen to Pérez. The OAS also expressed its support for the president and condemned 
the uprising. Just nine months later, a second coup, this time led by the air force and 
select leftist organizations, attempted to overthrow Pérez. Much more violent and without 
as much popular support, the coup failed once again. Again the OAS expressed support 
for Pérez and democracy, condemned the conspirators, and took no further action.177  
Even though both coup attempts failed, the OAS nonetheless missed these flashpoints to 
address the issues within Venezuela that led to the coup attempts. As mentioned in 
Section 4 of this chapter, the OAS was still young in terms of defending democracy at 
this point. 
Ten years later, democracy in Venezuela was challenged once again with the 
April 11, 2002 coup attempt against Chávez.178  For as much confusion as there was in 
Venezuela at the time of the coup attempt, Latin American heads of state and the OAS 
faced their own dilemmas about how to react. By coincidence, many of the Latin 
American presidents and their foreign ministers were in Costa Rica for a meeting of the 
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Rio Group at the time of the coup attempt. They promptly responded with a statement 
condemning the unlawful change of constitutional order and requesting a special session 
of the OAS Permanent Council in accordance with the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter. While some governments went on to make their own statements condemning the 
events in Venezuela, the United States, Colombia, and El Salvador all accepted the 
Carmona government and what they deemed a resignation by Chávez. During the 
Permanent Council special session held the same night of the coup attempt in 
Washington, D.C., the OAS Secretary General and council chairman initially denied the 
Venezuelan representative permission to join the meeting.179  The Secretary General 
ultimately changed course and allowed the Venezuelan representative to join the session 
the following day, but the initial denial represented a certain lack of assurance displayed 
by the individual responsible for setting the tone within the OAS, the Secretary General.     
By the time the Permanent Council met on April 13, masses of Venezuelans had 
gathered together to demand the return of Chávez. Details were beginning to emerge 
within Venezuela that Chávez had not resigned, and military officials were beginning to 
feel betrayed by actions taken by Carmona. In response, Carmona reinstated the National 
Assembly, but by then the tide was too strong, and Carmona resigned by 10:00 p.m. on 
April 13.180   
The Permanent Council was in session for the majority of that day, trying to keep 
up with the events in Venezuela to determine appropriate actions. With Argentina, 
Mexico, Brazil, and Canada adamantly denouncing Carmona as being the illegitimate 
leader of Venezuela, the United States and Colombia remained by his side. Attempting to 
use the Inter-American Democratic Charter to its favor, the United States argued that 
Chávez had acted unconstitutionally, therefore warranting removal from office.181   
When the Permanent Council finally published its resolution condemning the 
unconstitutional change of government, Chávez was already back in power. The 
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resolution did, however, take further action by calling for an OAS fact-finding mission 
and a special General Assembly meeting. Less than a week afterward, when the General 
Assembly met, it formally expressed satisfaction with Chávez’s return to power and the 
restoration of constitutional order in Venezuela.182  For the United States, Chávez’s anti-
imperialism governing style was worrisome and establishing favor with the Carmona 
regime early could have signified a swing in the relationship. Instead, the United States 
isolated itself as a minority within the OAS and furthered Chávez’s suspicion of U.S. 
meddling in Venezuelan affairs. 
As has been a recurring theme in Venezuela, democracy was challenged for the 
third time in just over thirty years, this time under Maduro’s presidency in 2014. This 
time around, there was no formal coup attempt against Maduro, but massive protests 
demanded that he step down. In 2013, Venezuela had a homicide rate of 39 per 100,000 
inhabitants, one of the worst in the world. Crime, corruption, a strengthened political 
opposition, and a less charismatic leader in Maduro all boiled over in February 2014 with 
students taking to the street to protest violent crimes on campus. Some groups were met 
with violence at the hands of the state, so the protests grew. Recognizing an opportunity 
to enact change, the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance joined the protest, with 
some MUD branches asking for Maduro’s resignation.183   
How did the OAS respond to the increasing unrest between Maduro’s government 
and the opposition?  Venezuela’s foreign and domestic policies had created a significant 
divide among OAS countries, with most either being adamantly in support of or 
adamantly against the Venezuelan government. Such a division created a stalemate 
within the OAS, with the organization taking no formal actions until March 7, 2014, 
despite the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which required that the OAS at least 
convene a special session to address the issue. Even when the OAS did take action, it 
came in the form of a Permanent Council resolution expressing support for the 
democratic institutions of Venezuela and its ability to control the social unrest. The 
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resolution specifically highlighted the principle of nonintervention that has long been a 
deciding factor in the OAS. As expected, the vote to pass the resolution was a consensus, 
but there were two states that voted with reservation: Panama and the United States. 
Panama voted with reservations regarding some of the wording in the resolution, while 
the United States was alone in its vote against the resolution. Among its many problems 
with the decision was the belief that any dialogue Maduro has with the opposition will be 
useless as the opposition will not be granted the necessary freedoms to engage in true 
negotiation.184  With the OAS choosing to only enact a resolution, UNASUR filled the 
action void and sent a large delegation of foreign ministers to Caracas to initiate 
negotiations between the government, the MUD, students, and human rights 
organizations. UNASUR also incorporated the Catholic Church, inviting Vatican 
Secretary of State Pietro Parolin to the talks.185  The United States and the OAS missed 
yet another chance to develop a positive presence in Venezuela. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Since its foundation in 1948, the OAS has been at the forefront of promoting 
regional cooperation. Over time, it developed from an institution largely designed to 
negotiate conflicts between states to one that can prevent and respond to a variety of 
interstate conflicts. In the last 10 to 15 years, however, other regional institutions have 
chipped away at the importance of the OAS. Tired of being bogged down by its multiple 
layers of bureaucracy and the perception that it is still heavily influenced by the United 
States, Latin Americans welcomed the arrival of alternatives such as UNASUR or 
ALBA. Nevertheless, the OAS remains the most institutionally developed regional 
organization in Latin America, and one of the few that encompasses nearly every state 
from North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. The 
organization has proven most successful when its members can act unanimously and 
under a consensus. When members disagree about an appropriate course of action, 
however, it often grinds to a halt, leaving a void that can be filled by other regional 
                                                
184 “Solidarity and Support for Democratic Institutions, Dialogue, and Peace in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela” (Washington, DC: Permanent Council, Organization of American States, March 7, 2014), 1–10. 
185 “Tipping Point,” International Crisis Group, 20–22. 
76 
organizations or through unilateral intervention. Regarding Venezuela, the United States 
has often voted against the majority in the OAS, causing not only friction within the 




A. EFFECT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY WITH VENEZUELA 
Can U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela be directly linked to a decrease in 
U.S. influence in the region?  For sure the rise of Chávez and new international 
organizations coincided with a lack of U.S. interest in the region. In his March 2014 
testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to 
Venezuela Otto Reich stresses the negative effects of declining U.S. presence in Latin 
America and the OAS:  
Part of the price of U.S. disengagement from Latin America can now be 
seen in such reprehensible spectacles as those witnessed this month at the 
OAS in which, for example, a member of the elected Venezuelan 
legislature representing the peaceful dissident movement and duly invited 
by an OAS Member State, was not allowed to speak, while earlier a 
majority of the OAS members voted to support the violent repression that 
the entire world has seen on video: uniformed soldiers, plain-clothes 
police and government-organized militia beating, shooting and killing 
unarmed civilians, mostly students and even a pregnant woman.186 
The testimony is often fiery and potentially even exaggerated, but Mr. Reich is 
trying to get the point across that the lack of attention the United States has paid to Latin 
America is having negative affects not just within the region, but across the entire 
international system in which the states of the western hemisphere operate. Reich’s 
testimony speaks specifically to a decrease in U.S. engagement with Latin America, but it 
also describes a lack of U.S. influence within the OAS. The current role and effectiveness 
of the United States in the OAS can be described as a result of its anti-Chávez and anti-
Maduro foreign policy. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the United States found it 
outside of the majority on two key OAS resolutions: the 2002 coup and the 2014 protests. 
By choosing to go against the consensus regarding Venezuela, the United States has 
isolated itself and lost influence within the organization. 
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B. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS 
U.S. foreign policy is not alone responsible for the decrease in U.S. influence in 
the region. As outlined in Chapter II, one of Chávez’s many goals was to decrease U.S. 
influence and he was successful in this effort as far as creating and strengthening other 
organizations to counter the OAS, specifically ALBA and UNASUR, two groups 
spearheaded by Chávez that excluded the United States. UNASUR in particular has even 
come to take the place of the OAS, acting as the mediator for the most recent social 
unrest in Venezuela. When combined with a decrease in OAS presence from the United 
States, Latin American-specific groups have helped decrease U.S. influence in the region. 
Further research is required to see just to what extent groups like ALBA, MERCOSUR, 
and UNASUR have attributed to the U.S. decline. 
Yet another factor that cannot be ignored is the effect of Edward Snowden’s 
classified leaks in 2013. Snowden, a former U.S. National Security Agency analyst, 
released numerous classified documents, many of which implicated the U.S. government 
in illegally monitoring calls of Latin American presidents. The event had severe 
implications for U.S. relations in the region, with many Latin American countries 
denouncing the actions and restructuring their foreign policies toward the United States. 
A particularly low point was the stranding of Bolivian president Evo Morales in Vienna 
as U.S. allies stopped air traffic in a search for Snowden. The Snowden leaks and 
subsequent ripple effect of negative reactions across Latin America certainly played a 
role in decreasing U.S. influence in the region, even if relations have improved as of 
late.187   
The leaks of Edward Snowden and the rise of non-OAS regional organizations 
have played a role in the decrease of U.S. influence in Latin America. They do not, 
however, discredit the role played by U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela. Efforts by 
the United States decreased its ability to act on its own interests within the OAS, 
subsequently decreasing the overall influence of the United States in Latin America. 
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C. WHAT NEXT? 
The United States has an opportunity to both increase its presence in the region 
and reinvigorate relations with one of its staunchest regional opponents by promoting and 
investing in the OAS. Investing means more than just financing the organization; the 
United States must also assign strong leaders to its OAS postings and truly support its 
decision-making processes. The history of the OAS proves that the organization has the 
necessary institutions to enforce change and that it is rather effective when votes are by 
consensus. Rather than engaging in battles of rhetoric in the media with Venezuela, U.S. 
officials should seek out matters of mutual consensus through the OAS. To ultimately 
protect its interests in the region, the United States must win back the trust of OAS 
member states, it must work itself back into the consensus. Only then can it engage in 
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